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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary
Background
This report for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (the Commission)
examines the threats to information privacy that have emerged in recent years,
focusing on the activities of the state. It argues that current privacy laws and
regulation do not adequately uphold human rights, and that fundamental reform is
required. It identifies two principal areas of concern: the state’s handling of personal
data, and the use of surveillance by public bodies.
Privacy concepts have a long tradition in Britain and can be traced back in common
law and, more recently, appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today,
the right to privacy is contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), and is incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act (HRA)
1998. As a statutory body, the Commission has a duty to encourage compliance with
the HRA and other human rights obligations under international treaties.
Developments in information technology and the purposes of state policy and the
private sector mean that we are now more vulnerable than ever to unwanted
surveillance. There is a growing demand for personal information from both the
public and private sectors. New technology allows organisations to store, analyse
and share such information in increasingly complex ways. Although recent legislation
has attempted to strengthen information privacy, the law has not kept pace with
changes in technology and in the uses to which it is put.
As a result, evidence suggests that the state is failing adequately to uphold the right
to privacy. There has been widespread concern regarding the expansion of
government databases and the processing of personal data. The Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, which governs the use of surveillance by the
police, local authorities and other public bodies, is marred by ambiguity, leaving open
the possibility of serious errors, inadvertent use of illegal surveillance techniques, and
inappropriate use of surveillance powers. Surveillance is increasingly becoming a
feature of everyday life in areas we previously considered private. There are
concerns about the proliferation of CCTV and its lack of regulation, as well as about
the potentially chilling effects of surveillance on, for example, peaceful protest. It is
little wonder, in this context, that privacy has become a key public concern.
Overall finding
The central finding of this report is that the existing approach to the protection of
information privacy in the UK is fundamentally flawed, and that there is a pressing
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need for widespread legislative reform in order to ensure that the rights contained in
Article 8 are respected. The report argues for the establishment of a number of key
‘privacy principles’ that can be used to guide future legal reforms and the
development of sector-specific regulation.
Key findings
• The privacy landscape has been transformed in recent years by a series of
landmark legislative reforms, including the HRA, the DPAs of 1984 and 1998, and
RIPA.
•

There has also been a dramatic increase in the amount of personal information
held by the public sector, due to technological developments and a steady
expansion of the role of the state.

•

The current system has a weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy.
Acts such as the DPA and RIPA are riddled with gaps and contradictions, and are
also interpreted, administered and overseen by a range of separate regulators,
independent tribunals, and courts. As a consequence, it has become very difficult
for individuals to understand what happens to their personal information, or what
they should do when that information is misused. The current system has failed to
protect privacy rights in a number of cases.

•

The problem is likely to become more acute. The state’s demands for personal
information will continue to grow in relation to national security, law enforcement
and citizens’ access to public services. So far, this expansion has been
accompanied by only a relatively small increase in the powers or resources
available to regulatory authorities such as the Information Commissioner’s Office
or the various Commissioners in the field of surveillance.

•

A more flexible, comprehensive approach to privacy is needed, based on a firm
commitment to Article 8 of the ECHR. This involves reforming the law and the
regulatory system to create a comprehensive privacy protection regime to
supersede the piecemeal inventory of measures or ‘tools’ implemented in a
disjointed fashion by various agents. The relevant regulatory agencies need to be
strengthened.

•

Law is essential: without legal specification of privacy rights, other instruments are
likely to be incapable of providing the remedies that individuals may need. The
law needs to be flexible enough to respond to the many and varied threats to
privacy.
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•

The principles written into law or underpinning it must be reflected in the
specification of other instruments. These are seen as reinforcements and
complements to the law and not as substitutes for, or weaker versions of, privacy
laws.

•

There are many ways of protecting privacy in addition to legal provisions,
including self-regulatory approaches, 'privacy-enhancing technologies', ‘privacy by
design’, and public awareness and education. Such complementary, non-legal
approaches to the protection of information privacy have an important part to play
in upholding information privacy rights.

Recommendations
This report makes four main recommendations:
(1)

A clear set of ‘privacy principles’ should be developed and used as the basis for
future legislation, and to guide the decisions of regulators and government
agencies concerned with information privacy and data collection in different
contexts.

(2)

Existing legislation that touches on privacy should be reformed to ensure that it
is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that it
enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At
minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and
data protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance.

(3)

Greater regulatory coherence should be promoted. There should be an effort to
rationalise and consolidate the current approach to the regulation of
surveillance and data collection in the UK, with particular attention paid to the
relationship between the various statutory Commissioners responsible for
protecting information privacy.

(4)

Improved technological, organisational, and other means of protection should
play an integral part in information privacy protection. The development and use
of technological and non-legal solutions to the problem of information privacy
protection should be encouraged by government, and more resources devoted
to public education and awareness around privacy.

The right to privacy is at risk of being eroded by the growing demand for information
by government and the private sector. Unless we start to reform the law and build a
regulatory system capable of protecting information privacy, we may soon find that it
is a thing of the past.
vii

INTRODUCTION

1.

Introduction

1.1 Background
Privacy has a long history in Britain. Concepts related to privacy can be traced back
in the common law and, more recently, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1984 first developed statutory protections for
information privacy. Under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), everyone has the ‘right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence’. Incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act
(HRA) 1998, Article 8 now provides an overarching framework for the protection of
privacy in the UK, as well as a set of principles that can be used to guide the
development of privacy and data protection laws in this country.
Yet despite the fact that there is now a clear right to privacy in the UK, over the past
10 years that right has come under increasing pressure from the state. Although the
spread of public space CCTV and the introduction of full body scanners in airports
such as Heathrow and Manchester are among the more visible signs of this ‘assault
on privacy’, increasingly the threat comes from the day-to-day work of government
departments, public bodies, and local authorities. As the state collects more and
more information about its citizens, and as developments in technology make it
easier to process and share this information, there is a danger that the protections
provided by Article 8 and existing UK data protection laws will be gradually eroded.
In recent years, the proliferation of government databases, a number of high-profile
data losses and examples of over-zealous police and local authority surveillance
have helped to highlight the threat to privacy posed by the state. The National DNA
database was found to be unlawful in the case of In S. & Marper v United Kingdom
where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the system of
indefinite retention of DNA samples, profiles and fingerprints of those who had not
been convicted of a crime breached Article 8 privacy rights. The Government is
currently proposing changes to the database. In recent years, widespread public
concern has been raised regarding proposals for other databases, not least that of a
national identity database.
In November 2007, the Government revealed that Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs (HMRC) had lost a computer disc containing the child benefit records of
over 25 million people.1 Less than a month later, the Government then disclosed that
a computer hard drive had also gone missing in the USA, this time with the personal
details of some three million UK learner drivers. Speaking to the House of Lords
Select Committee on the Constitution in the wake of these revelations, the then
Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, observed that such losses had not only
1
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damaged public confidence in the Government’s ability to handle sensitive
information, but had also raised serious concerns about the protection of information
privacy in the UK:
Concerns are increasing … We know now that something like nine out of
ten people ... have concerns about the security of their personal
information ... [and] 60 per cent are saying that they feel they have lost
control over the way in which their personal information is being used.2
Controversy has also arisen over the growing use of covert surveillance tactics in the
UK, not only by the police, but also by local authorities and other public bodies and
the adequacy of the oversight regime of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
(RIPA). According to a report published by Big Brother Watch in May 2010, in the last
two years 372 local authorities have made use of surveillance powers contained in
RIPA 2000, and have between them carried out over 8,500 separate surveillance
operations (Big Brother Watch, 2010; Travis, 2010). Not only have these powers
been used to prevent dog fouling, fly tipping, and to ensure that government
employees do not abuse parking privileges or sick leave, they have also been used
to monitor individuals suspected of breaking the newly imposed smoking ban. More
recently, a plan to establish a network of more than 200 CCTV cameras in and
around the predominantly Muslim areas of Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath in
Birmingham has led to renewed public concern about the use of police surveillance
powers, not least because of the lack of public consultation and potential threat to
individual privacy (Thames Valley Police, 2010).
RIPA has been commented on by the courts as 'a particularly puzzling statute' and
'perplexing'.3 The system of internal self-authorisation, without the requirement for
judicial oversight, has given rise to concern and leaves open the possibility of serious
errors and inadvertent use of otherwise illegal surveillance techniques. For example,
the courts recently found that internal authorisation was inappropriate where the
interference was with legal professional privilege. Further problems come to light in
relation to public spaces. There is no current statutory regime for the regulation of
CCTV cameras, despite the recommendations of the House of Lords. As such, it is
difficult for individuals who believe their privacy rights have been violated by the use
of CCTV to obtain a remedy under the law. Furthermore, the use of CCTV and other
public surveillance techniques can have a significant chilling effect on free speech
and peaceful protest, as the Court of Appeal noted in one case, finding that the
taking and retention of photographs by the police of protestors was disproportionate.4
Although it is clear that the public is deeply concerned about the steady expansion in
state surveillance and how their personal information is being used and protected,
there are also growing fears about the discriminatory effects of surveillance and data
2
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collection. According to separate reports published by the Commission (Equality and
Human Rights Commission, 2009) and GeneWatch (Staley, 2005), the National DNA
Database not only poses a danger to the privacy of the public at large, but also has
the potential to reinforce existing patterns of disadvantage and discrimination. As the
Commission's report notes, black men, young children, and people with mental
health conditions are already over-represented on the database, and there is
evidence to suggest that the proportion of Asian people on the database is increasing
beyond their proportion to the general population.5 Initiatives such as the National
DNA Database not only threaten to divide the UK into a country of privacy ‘haves’
and ‘have-nots’, but they also have the potential to undermine the general protections
guaranteed by Article 8 and the HRA. As the ECtHR observed in the 2008 case of S
and Marper v UK, while the state may be justified in using advanced technologies in
the fight against crime, it also has a special responsibility for ensuring that privacy
and personal information are properly protected.6
In the 2010 Queen’s Speech, the new Government acknowledged many of these
concerns, and announced a series of reforms aimed at curbing the spread of
surveillance in the UK. In particular, it pledged to abolish identity cards and the
National Identity Register, the ContactPoint database on children, and indicated that
it would abandon the next generation of biometric passports. ContactPoint has now
been abolished, and many of the Government’s other policy commitments are
already in the process of being fulfilled. Further, the Government has indicated that it
will limit the retention of information on the National DNA Database, introduce a new
regulatory framework for CCTV, and outlaw the fingerprinting of children at school
without parental permission. These reforms represent a significant shift in
government thinking about the importance of privacy and the need for clear limits on
state surveillance and data collection.
However, as this report will show, there is much more to be done. As UK privacy law
has struggled to keep pace with the demands of government and changes in the
technology of information gathering and data sharing, the protection of information
privacy has become increasingly fragmented and incoherent. In addition to the
protections provided by Article 8 and the HRA, aspects of individual privacy in the UK
are also governed by the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, RIPA, and the common
law. The situation is further complicated by the fact that although Scotland and
Northern Ireland are subject to the HRA, they also have their own distinct legislative
regimes when it comes to matters of privacy and data protection. Equally, there is
considerable confusion surrounding the regulation of surveillance by the police and
security services, and the role of the various bodies responsible for monitoring them
and enforcing the law. In part, some of this confusion has arisen from the ambiguity
that surrounds the rules and procedures set out in RIPA.7 It is also, however, a
3
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function of the fact that there is considerable overlap between the powers and
responsibilities of the various commissioners responsible for protecting privacy in the
UK, as well as large gaps in the regulatory frameworks in which they currently
operate. Finally, there is also a lack of public and political understanding about the
importance of privacy, how surveillance works, and the types of legal redress
available to individuals who can prove they have been harmed by the misuse of their
personal information.
If the current programme of legislative reform is to be successful, it must be
accompanied by a more fundamental review of law regarding information privacy and
the regulation of surveillance and data collection in the UK. Taking the right to privacy
contained in Article 8 of the ECHR as our starting point, there is a clear need for a
more coherent approach to the problem of reconciling privacy with competing
interests such as security, crime prevention, and the efficient delivery of public
services. It is also important to ensure that any changes to the existing law of privacy
and the regulation of surveillance are consistent with the principles set out in the
HRA, and strengthen the right to respect for private and family life contained in Article
8 of the ECHR.
1.2 The aim of the report
As a statutory body, the Commission has a duty to promote equality, build good
relations and protect human rights, and encourage compliance with the HRA and
other human rights obligations under international treaties (Equality Act 2006,
Section 9). In fulfilling these roles, and as a modern regulator, it is appropriate for the
Commission to consider the protection of information privacy. Government has a
responsibility to ensure that the information gathering and surveillance activities of
the state are consistent with the right to respect for private and family life, and that
any infringement of this right is proscribed by law, properly justified, necessary, and
proportionate. Further, the state has positive obligations to ensure protection of
Convention rights; this could include requirements to establish a sufficient statutory
and regulatory framework to ensure that Convention rights, including Article 8 rights,
are not infringed.
The aim of the report is to provide an overview of the current state of information
privacy law and surveillance regulation in the UK, with a particular focus on the
question of whether the rights contained in Article 8 of the ECHR are being
adequately protected. The report also examines various approaches to the legal
protection of privacy and the regulation of surveillance and data collection, identifies
weaknesses in the current approach to privacy and surveillance, and makes a series
of recommendations aimed at ensuring that the rights contained in Article 8 are
respected. Although this report is not intended to provide a detailed blueprint for the
4
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protection and regulation of information privacy, it aims to develop the Commission’s
expertise in this important area, and seeks to establish the Commission as a key
contributor to the ongoing debate about the future of privacy in the UK.
The scope of the report is limited in four main ways. First, it focuses on one particular
aspect of privacy: information privacy. As a result, although the report touches on
aspects of physical privacy – such as an individual’s right to privacy in their body or
their home – its main concern is with the collection, use, and communication of
personal information. Information privacy is affected by what happens in other
dimensions insofar as personal data may be collected through processes associated
with them – for instance, body searches and scanning, or electronic tagging. But it is
not practical to investigate all dimensions in a report of this nature, although the
human rights issues as well as certain recommendations are also germane to a
multidimensional view of privacy.
Second, because one of the key responsibilities of the Commission is to ensure that
government and the public sector respect the rights set out in the HRA, this report
focuses on threats to information privacy arising from the activities of the state.
Although the growing use of personal information by the private sector also poses a
significant challenge to privacy, this report only considers the private sector insofar
as it acts in conjunction with the state as is, for example, increasingly the case in the
areas of health care and social services.
Third, this report does not attempt to deal with the relationship between information
privacy and the media. Even though many well-known privacy cases involve media
coverage of prominent politicians, business people, and celebrities, a detailed
consideration of the complex issues surrounding the relationship between the right to
privacy and the right to freedom of expression is beyond the scope of a report of this
length.
Fourth, although this report is concerned with the protection of information privacy in
the UK, its main focus is on England and Wales. References to the relevant law in
Scotland – which is based, in part, on a different legislative and regulatory framework
– are included largely for purposes of comparison, and the position in Northern
Ireland is not considered. Applicable laws are treated as uniform throughout the UK
except where otherwise indicated. Nonetheless, any reform of the law must take
account of differences between the UK’s three legal jurisdictions and the devolution
settlements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Central to this report are two key assumptions. First, that any reform of the existing
law must take place within the broad framework established by the HRA. By
5
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incorporating Article 8 of the ECHR into domestic law – which establishes that all
individuals have a right to respect for their private and family life – the HRA
fundamentally changed the way in which privacy is understood in the UK, and
substantially increased the level of protection afforded to individual privacy in both
the public and private sectors. This report takes the provisions of the HRA as its
starting point, and as a consequence the reforms proposed are all intended to
enhance the protections provided by Article 8.
The second assumption is that it is important for the government and parliament to
be clear about the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, and what it is that
privacy laws and other means of regulation seek to protect. For the law of privacy
and the regulation of surveillance and data collection to develop in a coherent and
consistent way, future reforms must be guided by a commitment to a clear set of
principles. In this report, a number of justifications of privacy are examined, with a
view to explaining how these alternative accounts of privacy lead to different
conclusions about the role of the law and legal regulation. By relating the specific
proposals presented in this report to these justifications, we hope to provide a better
insight into the choices available and to provide lawmakers with a principled
framework for future reform.
1.3 Structure of the report
Following on from this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the key
challenges and threats to information privacy, with a particular focus on the various
social and technological trends that have emerged in recent years. Although
successive UK governments have sought to provide protection for privacy through a
range of statutes and a complex system of regulation, what has emerged is a weak,
fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy that is ill-equipped to deal with
challenges that lie ahead. This Chapter stresses the need to develop a more flexible,
comprehensive approach to the protection of privacy, based on a firm commitment to
Article 8 of the ECHR and a combination of both principles-based regulation and nonlegal protections.
Chapter 3 then looks at why privacy matters. It highlights several prominent and
overlapping theories of privacy that have influenced existing approaches to
regulation, and emphasises the importance of taking a context-specific approach to
issues of information privacy. In particular, this Chapter considers which approaches
to privacy are most likely to enhance – rather than undermine – the rights contained
in Article 8 of the ECHR and the existing framework of data protection in the UK.
In Chapter 4, the report then turns to a detailed analysis of the various laws and
regulations that govern the data protection and privacy in the UK. Using various
6
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recent examples and cases, this Chapter argues that the current framework is no
longer fit for purpose, and in urgent need of rationalisation and reform. In addition to
emphasising the need for greater legislative consistency and regulatory coherence,
the report argues that more attention needs to be paid to the requirements of Article
8, and the need to consider complementary, non-legal approaches to the protection
of information privacy.
Chapter 5 examines various complementary approaches to the protection of personal
data, including the use of codes of practice and statutory guidelines. In addition, it
discusses various non-legal means of protecting information privacy – such as
‘privacy-enhancing technologies’, ‘privacy by design’, and ‘privacy impact
assessment’ – all of which aim to ensure that organisations pay more attention to
privacy and to see that their data handling practices are consistent with the demands
of Article 8. The Chapter also considers the importance of public awareness and
education programmes, and the need for regulators, non-governmental
organisations, and the media to play a greater role in helping the public to protect
their own privacy.
In Chapter 6, a number of new approaches to the protection of information privacy
are considered. These include new legislation aimed at consolidating the current law,
and a re-organisation of the existing system of privacy regulation and
Commissioners. In addition, this Chapter argues in favour of the incorporation of
more ‘soft law’ and technical means of privacy protection. However, establishing
these reforms requires a foundation of principles – related to concepts of privacy – as
the touchstone for information privacy protection. The report finds that ‘principlesbased regulation’ and legislation can reformulate existing principles, supplementing
them by further ones reflecting changing technological and policy circumstances as
well as contextual variations shaping individuals’ experience of privacy. In addition,
reform must involve other participants and policy actors besides lawmakers and
regulators.
Based on this, Chapter 7 makes four specific recommendations:
(1)

That there is a need for the development of a clear set of ‘privacy principles’
that can be used as the basis for future legislation, and which can be used to
guide the decisions of regulators and government agencies concerned with
information privacy and data collection in different contexts.

(2)

Existing legislation that touches on privacy should be reformed to ensure that it
is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that it
enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At
7
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minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and
data protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance.
(3)

That an effort should be made to rationalise and consolidate the current
approach to the regulation of surveillance and data collection in the UK, with
particular attention being paid to the relationship between the various statutory
Commissioners responsible for protecting information privacy.

(4)

That the use of technological and non-legal information privacy protections
should be encouraged by government, and that more resources should be
devoted to public education and awareness around privacy.

Chapter 8 concludes the report by restating that information privacy is a fundamental
right which is at risk of being eroded by the growing demand for information by
government and the private sector. It urges the reform of law and the creation of a
regulatory system capable of protecting information privacy in order to preserve the
right to privacy in future.

8
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2.

The changing landscape of privacy

2.1 Introduction
In recent years the landscape of privacy has changed dramatically in the UK. New
information technologies and forms of communication have continued to emerge and
develop, and have presented the public and private sectors with a host of new ways
of collecting, processing, and sharing the personal information of their clients and
customers. At the same time, although a series of landmark legislative reforms –
most notably the introduction of the HRA 1998, the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998,
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 – have transformed how
the UK approaches data collection and state surveillance, over the last 10 years the
law and other regulatory mechanisms have struggled to keep up with the pace of
technological change or to develop a comprehensive framework for the protection of
information privacy.
We have also seen a rise in public interest in privacy, and a growing anxiety about
the prospect of the UK being transformed into a ‘surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004;
Surveillance Studies Network, 2006). According to a report analysing the Information
Commissioner’s Office’s (ICO) tracking of public attitudes (SMSR, 2010), protecting
personal information continues to be of great concern to the general public. Indeed,
only prevention of crime ranks higher. Overall, a majority of the UK public continues
to lack confidence in the way their personal information is protected and handled,
with 60 per cent believing that they have lost control over the way personal data is
collected and processed.
Thomas and Walport’s (2008) review of data sharing also underlined this point,
referring to a number of high profile incidents involving the loss of personal data by
government that have only heightened public anxiety over how their data is looked
after. In October 2007, for example, two computer discs owned by HM Revenue and
Customs with the personal details (names, addresses, National Insurance numbers
and bank details) of all families in the UK who were claiming benefits went missing
when the disks were sent by a junior officer via TNT courier to the National Audit
Office. It was later revealed that the data protection manual for HMRC staff was itself
under restriction and available to only senior members, not junior civil servants. In
addition, the ICO has recently highlighted further examples of serious data losses,
including:
•

The theft of two unencrypted laptops containing personal information relating to
17 patients, which were stolen from the Medical Day Centre of Birmingham
Children’s Hospital. The data included patient diagnoses, video recordings and
information on the health of individual patients. (July 2010)
9
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•

The loss of a CD containing scans of 112 patient records from the Intensive Care
Unit of New Cross Hospital. The CD was discovered at a bus stop near the
hospital and was unencrypted with no password protection. (August 2010)

•

The loss of an unencrypted USB stick containing sensitive data of patients’
conditions and medication, mislaid on a train journey by a junior doctor employed
by East & North Hertfordshire NHS Trust. It has not yet been recovered.
(September 2010)

•

The loss of an unencrypted memory stick containing personal information held by
the Forth Valley NHS Board, which was later handed in to the press. Enquires
established that the information had been uploaded by a member of staff onto a
personally owned memory stick that was then lost. (September 2010)

As a consequence of changes in technology, communications, and public attitudes to
personal information, the landscape of privacy in the UK is now drastically different
from that which existed even a decade ago. Although the law, and society generally,
are now faced with a range of difficult choices when it comes to the question of how
best to regulate the use of personal data and protect individual privacy, there is
clearly a public appetite for change and reform. Put simply, the landscape of privacy
has never been as fluid as it is in 2010, nor has there been a more opportune
moment for reform and the strengthening of a rights-based approach to the
protection of information privacy.
This Chapter provides a brief overview of the key challenges and threats to
information privacy in the UK, and identifies some of the major social and
technological trends that have and continue to transform the landscape. It touches on
a wide range of social, technological, and legal issues that will be developed
throughout this report, with a view to providing a perspective on the challenges and
opportunities ahead as regards the protection of information privacy in the UK.
2.2 Information privacy: challenges, concerns, and responses
Although privacy is by its very nature a fragile right, (Goold, 2007) personal
information privacy is under particular threat in today’s ‘information economy’ and
‘information-age government’. Advanced systems of information and communication
technology (ICT) now collect, process, and share information about every aspect of
an individual’s life, information that is used to construct profiles of our habits and
behaviour, track our location and movements, evaluate risks and opportunities, and
shape policies and business plans. As the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution noted in 2009:8
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Surveillance is an inescapable part of life in the UK. Every time we make a
telephone call, send an email, browse the Internet, or even walk down our
local high street, our actions may be monitored and recorded. To respond
to crime, combat the threat of terrorism, and improve administrative
efficiency, successive UK governments have gradually constructed one of
the most extensive and technologically advanced surveillance systems in
the world. At the same time, similar developments in the private sector
have contributed to a profound change in the character of life in this
country. The development of electronic surveillance and the collection and
processing of personal information have become pervasive, routine, and
almost taken for granted. Many of these surveillance practices are
unknown to most people, and their potential consequences are not fully
appreciated. (House of Lords 2009, para. 1)
The ability to collect and process personal information is essential to law
enforcement, national security, and public sector service delivery. Yet although
information systems and data sharing have always been a central part of the modern
state’s bureaucratic infrastructure, technological developments and a steady
expansion in the role of government have resulted in a dramatic increase in the
amount of personal information held by the public sector in recent years. In order to
maintain the UK’s borders, provide effective policing, and combat the threat of
terrorism, successive governments have argued that it is vital for the state to be able
to obtain, access, process, and share large amounts of these confidential details.
Furthermore, as the line between the public and private sectors has continued to
blur, this information is increasingly being shared. Add to this the growing popularity
of internet shopping, online banking, and social networking sites like Facebook, and it
is easy to see why data regulation and governance has become steadily more
complex.
As more information is made available and shared between organisations, the
danger that this information will be misused, misplaced or misunderstood increases.
People may, for example, consent to provide information to an organisation for one
purpose and then later discover that the same (or some other) organisation has used
it for something else, possibly in breach of the DPA. Where that information has been
taken out of context and combined with other pieces of personal data, it may result in
the construction of a profile that is unwanted or unauthorised, or that the individual
may believe to be inaccurate or misleading. In many cases, an individual will only
discover that their personal information has been shared when it used by an
organisation to make some decision about them, such as whether they are eligible
for a state benefit or qualify for a credit card or bank loan. As the demand for
information in both the public and private sectors grows, it is becoming increasingly
difficult for individuals to understand what happens to their personal information, or
what they should do when that information is misused.
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Previous governments have tried to respond to these various developments and
challenges, but unfortunately many of their efforts have met with limited success. The
introduction of the DPA was, for example, hailed at the time as a major development
in the protection of information privacy in the UK. Enacted in response to the
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the DPA established a new legal
framework for the protection of personal data. In addition to laying down a clear set of
principles for the collection, processing and use of personal data by both public and
private sectors, the Act also establishes a regulatory structure designed to ensure
compliance with these principles and prevent practices that might threaten individual
privacy. However, the Act is also severely limited in a number of key respects. First
and foremost, it does not directly address many of the problems associated with the
widespread sharing of personal data within government, between the public and
private sectors, or between private organisations.
Similarly, RIPA was introduced to meet the UK's obligations to place state
surveillance systems under an Article 8-compliant regime. However – as will be
described later – there are serious flaws with RIPA itself, including its unclear system
of authorisation, deficiencies in judicial oversight, and inappropriate use of powers –
for example, by local authorities. Certain aspects of surveillance, most notably in
relation to CCTV, stand outside the regulatory regime. In addition, many of the rules
and regulations contained in the DPA and RIPA, as well as the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) 2000, and its counterpart in Scotland, are interpreted,
administered and overseen by a range of separate regulators and independent
tribunals, and courts.9 Although the introduction of the HRA has seen the
establishment of a general right to privacy – by virtue of the incorporation of Article 8
of the ECHR into domestic law – the courts have been relatively cautious in their
application and development of the right. As a consequence, there is no common
approach to the protection of personal information in the UK, or a clear legal
consensus on the limits of individual privacy.
It is against this weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to regulation that concerns
about information privacy and state surveillance have begun to emerge in recent
years. While the UK has one of the most extensive systems of public-area
surveillance in the world – with estimates of the number of CCTV cameras running
into the millions – as well as a large array of massive state databases, it would be
wrong to assume that the public are unconcerned about privacy and data protection.
As has already been noted, recent revelations about the loss of personal data by
many departments and agencies of the state, and the use of RIPA powers by local
authorities, have served to focus media and public attention on the question of
privacy, and have led to a fundamental review of the way in which government and
the private sector collect and use personal information (Cabinet Office, 2008).
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In addition, the ambivalent reaction to the now-abandoned national identity card
scheme has also served to bring into sharper relief the importance of privacy in the
context of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Although in the past the
question of how much the state should be allowed to know about us may not have
been especially high on the political agenda, there are now calls for a reconsideration
of the current approach to data collection and sharing within government, and the
limits of e-government more generally. Equally, in recent years both the public and
the courts have begun to question whether Article 8 goes far enough, and whether a
more general right to privacy that applies beyond the public sector is needed. In
short, the landscape of privacy is changing rapidly, both as new challenges to the
current privacy regime emerge and public concern over the future of privacy
continues to grow.
2.3 Opportunities for reform
There are a number of reasons why the area of privacy is currently in need of reform.
First, developments in information technology, as well as changes in the way in
which the public and private sectors now collect and use personal data, have
produced a range of challenges that did not exist when the current system of privacy
protections was established close to a decade ago. In addition, the sheer amount of
personal information being collected, processed, and shared in the UK now presents
a serious challenge to both the existing legislative regime and the regulators charged
with administering it (Goold, 2009). Although recent changes to the funding and
powers of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) have, for example, helped to
ameliorate this problem, it remains the case that many of those responsible for
protecting privacy and enforcing the law still lack the necessary resources or
statutory authority to do so effectively. Finally, while it may have been the case that
there was no need for an overarching rationale behind the protection of privacy in the
past, as the distinction between state and private surveillance continues to be blurred
by the increase of data collection and sharing across and between sectors, there is a
danger that the system of regulation has become so disparate and convoluted that it
is beyond the ability of ordinary members of the public to understand or to resort to it
in protection of their rights.
Although it may be tempting to view the current system of privacy protections as a
barrier to reform, this report takes a different view. While it may be true that the
existing system of regulation lacks a coherent, guiding rationale and is in need of
more resources, many of its constituent parts are functioning reasonably well and
enjoy broad support. For example, the enactment of the DPA – and with it the
establishment of the ICO – is widely regarded as a having been a fundamental step
forward in UK privacy protection, and both the Act and the ICO continue to enjoy
significant public and political support. Similarly, few would argue that the
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incorporation of Article 8 of the ECHR into domestic law has not been a positive step,
and in many respects the contribution to UK privacy law stands as one of the major
achievements of the HRA.
Where there is, however, room for change, is in the overarching rationale and
framework of regulation. As the technologies of data collection and surveillance
continue to converge and become more ubiquitous, a system of legislation based on
the idea that different sectors of government and society require different forms of
privacy regulation is beginning to look increasingly outdated and impractical. This
raises the question whether we need to build on existing legal, technological, and
institutional frameworks for the protection of privacy, or whether more fundamental
reform is needed, and is one of the key questions addressed in this report. How do
we move forward in such a way as to preserve what is working well in the current
system, while also ensuring that privacy protections are developed that are capable
of dealing with a rapidly changing social and technological landscape?
2.4 Summary
This Chapter has provided a brief overview of the changing landscape of privacy in
the UK, with a view to identifying some of the key challenges and opportunities for
reform. Successive UK governments have sought to provide protection for privacy
through a range of statutes and a complex system of regulation, but what has
emerged is a weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy that is ill-equipped
to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. There is a clear need for reform and a
need to develop a more flexible, comprehensive approach to the protection of
privacy. This must be based on a firm commitment to Article 8 of the ECHR, and
combine principles-based legislation and regulation with non-legal protections.
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3.

Why privacy matters

3.1 Introduction
How does one place a value on privacy? What should the law of privacy aim to
protect? How do we reconcile a strong commitment to privacy as a fundamental right
with the demands of national security, law enforcement, and the state’s demands for
personal information? Does the current approach to the protection of privacy in the
UK leave certain groups vulnerable to excessive state surveillance and exacerbate
existing patterns of discrimination? Is it correct to talk about the need for a balance
between privacy and the public interest, or does this suggest a false opposition
between these two values?
These are all questions that lie at the heart of any discussion about the development
of privacy law and the regulation of state surveillance and data collection. In order to
answer them, it is not only important to have a clear understanding of what is
possible in terms of existing legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms, but also
an appreciation of the justifications for privacy. Unless we can agree on why privacy
matters, we cannot hope to develop a coherent or consistent framework for its
protection. In this section, we briefly review some of the major theories of privacy,
and consider the relationship between privacy and the state’s need for personal
information. Different justifications of privacy are likely to point to different
conclusions about the type and extent of regulation needed – questions that are
explored in later chapters.
3.2 Making a case for privacy
There are several dimensions of privacy, including privacy of one’s personal
information, one’s body, personal space, and one’s communications. The focus of
this project is on information privacy, but it also touches on certain aspects of the
privacy of communications where records of communication are retained.
One of the major difficulties associated with attempts to protect privacy is the problem
of definition.10 Privacy is said to be ‘a concept in disarray’ (Solove, 2008, p.1), and it
is difficult to find a single, accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is most useful
to see ‘privacy’ as an umbrella term that covers a range of situations in which many
different types of interests are affected (Solove, 2008, ch.2). This perspective
recognises, for example, that some forms of personal information only become
‘private’ due to the circumstances in which they are collected or communicated
(Nissenbaum, 2010). Equally, it acknowledges that the way we view privacy is
intimately bound up with our understanding the public/private divide, and that this
boundary is constantly shifting as a result of the ever-changing relationship between
the individual and the state. Finally, this broad approach to privacy helps to ensure
15

PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY

that we do not simply regard privacy as a function of person or place, but rather as a
product of the two, and that we do not fall into the trap of thinking that privacy is just
about confidentiality or good data management practices.
Just as there is no agreed definition of privacy, there are also many different but
overlapping ways in which privacy can be understood and justified. Privacy can, for
example, be seen as a good in itself – as essential to our development as individuals,
and bound up with ideas of dignity, liberty, and ‘personhood’. In addition to promoting
these values, privacy can also be justified on more instrumental grounds. Without a
degree of privacy, it can become very difficult for individuals to maintain a distinction
between their personal and public lives, or to exercise other important social and
political rights, such as rights to freedom of religion, freedom of association, and
freedom of expression.
Although it is beyond the scope of this report to consider these and other
justifications for privacy in any great depth, it is important to be aware of the different
ways of understanding privacy if we are to develop a programme of reform based on
a set of clear and coherent principles. For the purpose of this report, we have
identified six main theories for privacy, which can be summarised as follows:
Privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’
Central to this notion of privacy is the ability of individuals to keep society and the
state at bay, and to obtain a remedy where there has been an unwanted intrusion.
The notion of privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’ was first advanced by Warren and
Brandeis (1890), and has been referred to extensively in discussions of the Fourth
Amendment in the United States and with reference to Section 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Many of the privacy protections developed in the
UK as well as in the United States and Canada are based on this notion of privacy,
and it has deep roots in the civil liberties traditions of these countries. This idea
corresponds to many conventional understandings of privacy, such as ‘a man’s home
is his castle’, and reflects a desire on the part of individuals to avoid the prying eyes
of others. This approach to privacy also plays a prominent part in many liberal
accounts of the state, which stress the need for clear limits on the power of the state
and the importance of privacy to the exercise of individual freedom.
Privacy as an aspect of personhood
According to this justification, all individuals need a degree of privacy in order to
protect their dignity, develop as persons, and maintain a sense of self while retaining
the ability to form meaningful relationships with others (Bloustein, 1964; Rachels,
1975; Schoeman, 1992; Rössler, 2005). Closely linked to ideas of autonomy and
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liberty, this justification has frequently been relied on by the ECtHR in its discussions
of the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR (Feldman, 1994, 2002).
Privacy as control over information
Most commonly associated with the privacy theorist Westin (1967), and also in the
German conception of ‘informational self-determination’, this account of privacy
argues that individuals have the right to control their own personal information, and
should be able to determine how and when information about them is communicated
to others. Often associated with the idea of ‘fair information practices’, this idea has
been very influential in the development of data protection laws across the world, and
has been at the heart of discussions about the appropriate balance to be struck
between the individual’s control over personal information and the state’s interests in
processing data. It is important to note that while this justification of privacy presumes
that some level of control over personal information is possible, it also acknowledges
that the degree of control an individual is likely to be able to exercise will depend on
their circumstances, as well as on the type of information in question.
Privacy as limited access to the self
Broader than the idea of privacy as the right to be let alone, this justification of
privacy is based on the idea that individuals should be able to control who has
access to both their person and to information about them (Gavison, 1980). Often
linked to arguments about informational self-determination, this justification suggests
that privacy should be understood as a form of proprietary interest which gives
individuals the right to determine who they interact with and on what terms (Gross,
1967).
Privacy as secrecy
Similar to the idea of privacy as limited access, this narrower justification maintains
that privacy is best understood as the individual’s right to conceal facts about herself
(Posner, 1978). It is a justification that has enjoyed considerable support from
economic theorists of law, and that focuses on the idea that the value of information
is often dependent on our ability to keep it secret and prevent unwanted disclosure.
This justification is often criticised, however, on the grounds that the only people who
need secrecy are those who have something to hide. This argument ignores the fact
that there are many reasons why a person may want to keep something private, and
that a desire for secrecy is not always evidence of bad behaviour. Individuals may,
for example, keep personal information secret not out of any sense of shame, but
because they fear that the information may be misunderstood when taken out of
context. Equally, we keep some types of intimate information secret because we
recognise that the act of sharing it can be an important step in the formation of close
personal relationships.
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Privacy as a social and political value
In addition to recognising privacy as an individual right with intrinsic value, this view
of privacy is based on the claim that privacy is fundamentally important to the
maintenance of a liberal, democratic society. According to this approach, privacy is
valuable for two related reasons. First, it enables individuals to establish and
maintain a variety of complex social relationships, and thereby contributes to the
development of a rich and diverse society. Second, it is important because it is
necessary to protect key political rights – such as freedom of association, freedom of
expression, and freedom of religion – from the chilling effects of excessive state
surveillance: a private ‘space’ is necessary for the development of dissenting views
that enrich political life. It is therefore in the public interest for a democratic society to
protect privacy, in addition to whatever value privacy may have for the individual
(Regan, 1995; Bennett and Raab, 2006; Solove, 2008; Goold, 2009; Nissenbaum,
2010).
Given the extent to which these justifications overlap with one another, it is not
necessary to choose between them. Instead, we should adopt a comprehensive
approach to the question of privacy that both recognises that there are many
legitimate justifications for privacy, while also acknowledging that the strength of any
given justification will, to a large extent, depend on circumstances and context.
Different ideas of privacy come into play, for example, when people are engaged in
commercial activities as opposed to simply seeking the solitude they need to
maintain a sense of dignity and self esteem. Equally, members of lawful political
organisations may have very different reasons for wanting to keep their meetings
private when compared with someone undergoing regular treatment for a serious
illness. Privacy depends on context, and as such can be justified on many different
grounds.
Having said this, however, it is still fundamentally important to be clear about what it
is that any privacy law or regulatory regime is trying to achieve. Given that privacy is
so notoriously difficult to define, there is always a temptation to avoid being clear
about the exact purpose of protection, and to focus instead on addressing particular
threats or developing responses to immediate challenges. There are significant
disadvantages to this approach, as emphasised by a leading expert on privacy law
and theory (Solove, 2008, p.2):
Judges, politicians, … and scholars have often failed to adequately
conceptualize the problems that privacy law is asked to redress. Privacy
problems are often not well articulated, and as a result, we frequently lack
a compelling account of what is at stake when privacy is threatened and
what precisely the law must do to solve these problems.
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In attempting to develop new forms of privacy protection – or to reform existing ones
– it is important to clarify which of the above justifications is being relied upon and in
what context. Although these ideas of privacy are not mutually exclusive, they are
clearly focused on different values and concerns. As a result, the choice of
justification will have a significant effect on how one defines the limits of and
legitimate exceptions to privacy, identifies potential threats to privacy, and chooses
between different legal and regulatory protections for privacy. This can be
demonstrated by focusing on the question of whether the law should be based on a
default expectation of privacy or a default assumption of information disclosure. If
one is committed to the idea that privacy is, for example, essential to the exercise of
personal autonomy and the development of the self, then one is more likely to take a
‘rights-based’ approach and conclude that the law should require a prima facie
justification for all privacy infringements – especially, for example, where visual
surveillance is involved. In contrast, if one believes that privacy is bound up with the
ability to control information, then – in circumstances where personal data is
collected – one is more likely to invoke fair information practices and laws that seek
to reconcile privacy interests with the information demands of the public and private
sectors. In practice, these approaches are normally combined, and the means/ends
distinction between rights and information control is not clear.
3.3 Privacy and the state
As indicated earlier, the main focus of this report is the state, which is taken to refer
to central and local government, law-enforcement authorities, and other
organisations outside the ‘public sector’ undertaking public functions or that have
access to personal data collected on behalf of the state. In addition to the problem of
defining privacy, there is also the question of how privacy rights should be
understood in the context of the state’s legitimate need for information. Many recent
studies and investigations – for example, by the Surveillance Studies Network (2006)
– have shown how surveillance is increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life in
areas that were previously considered ‘private’. As surveillance cameras and tracking
devices become cheaper and more ubiquitous, it is increasingly difficult for people to
find places that can truly be considered private. Instead, the promise of privacy in
public spaces such as streets and parks is increasingly unrealistic, with the result that
the boundaries of individual privacy are increasingly being tested and eroded.
In addition, these studies have also revealed the extent to which personal information
collected by the state is being shared across government agencies or with the private
sector, often without the knowledge of the individuals concerned. Aside from the fact
that this sharing increases the likelihood that information will be taken out of context
or used for purposes other than those for which it was originally collected, it also
makes it difficult for individuals to keep track of their personal information. If they are
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unable to determine easily what the state or private sector knows about them, then it
becomes extremely difficult to challenge decisions made on the basis of that
information, to check its accuracy, or to hold anyone accountable for errors or
misuse.
To some extent, the DPA helps to ensure that the state does not systematically
misuse personal information or engage in activities that might seriously undermine
individual privacy. For example, by laying down the requirement of ‘fair processing’
and giving individuals the ability to access their data, the Act helps to make the use
of information by the state more transparent. In addition, the Act also sets out the
conditions for the legitimate collection and sharing of personal data without consent –
for example, in the exercise of statutory powers – and prohibits the use of personal
data for incompatible purposes. However, these important rules and restrictions are
often difficult to enforce, and remedies can be hard to come by. Although public
awareness of the right to see one’s own personal data reportedly increased from 75
per cent in 2004 to over 90 per cent in 2009, many individuals remain unaware of the
range of protections provided by the DPA (ICO, 2010b, p.19). Furthermore, even
where they are aware, they may be discouraged from exercising their rights by the
apparent lack of significant sanctions.
Similarly, RIPA was created to ensure that the system for regulation of the use of
intrusive surveillance powers was in accordance with Article 8, and establishes a
process of authorisation for the use of intrusive surveillance powers. However, the
Act is complex and difficult to use, and runs to some 30 further statutory instruments.
There are concerns about the adequacy of the system of self- authorisation, and in
many areas – including the regulation of CCTV – the Act's coverage is not
comprehensive. Placing limits on surveillance does not guarantee that personal data
is being collected or used appropriately, in part because those limitations are
constantly being tested by the state and other public organisations.12
By placing greater emphasis on the importance of privacy, the law can help to
resolve any conflicts that arise between the public or private sector demand for
information and individuals’ ability to control and monitor how information about them
is used. In determining the limits of individual privacy, however, we must be clear
about why and under what circumstances government agencies should be allowed to
collect, process, and share personal information. Rules, regulations, and human
rights not only place limits on the information gathering and surveillance powers of
the state, but also help to define the boundary between the public and private
spheres and establish the importance of information privacy in a democratic society.
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Based on the theories of privacy outlined above, there are a number of ways to
approach this task. Perhaps the most obvious starting point is to note that, while
privacy should be protected as a fundamental right, its infringement must always be
in accordance with the law, necessary, proportionate and justified. Privacy can,
however, also be regarded as one of several competing legal interests or rights. If we
take the former approach and privilege privacy, then attempts to restrict individual
privacy in the interests of national security, the enforcement of law, or improvement in
the efficiency of public service delivery are more likely to be seen as inherently
problematic, and subject to rigorous tests of necessity and proportionality. This is
because the promotion of such goals frequently involves restricting the general ambit
of the right, and threatens to undermine privacy’s legal status, as well as its symbolic
or practical significance. If, however, privacy is regarded as a legal interest like any
other – or, in weaker terms, as an individual preference – then it becomes more
amenable to balancing exercises in an effort to reconcile the aims of the individual
with those of the state. Put another way, a key question is whether potential threats
to privacy should be assessed according to human rights criteria such as necessity
and proportionality, or instead according to principles such as reasonableness and
balancing.13
Another way to approach the question of how to reconcile privacy and state interests
is to ask whether a contextual approach to privacy should be adopted. According to
this approach, while it may be appropriate to provide strong privacy protection in
some contexts (such as the home), it may not be appropriate to extend similar
protection in others (such as airports or government buildings). Here, the key is to
recognise that the importance of privacy varies according to circumstances, and that
it may be necessary to develop distinct legal protections and regulatory frameworks
tailored to different contexts and state functions. Taking this approach may resolve
much of the apparent tension between privacy and the public interest, if only because
it forces one to acknowledge that the importance of both – and the legitimacy of
overriding the right of privacy – varies according to the particular situation in which
they come into conflict.
There are also other issues that must be taken into account when considering the
relationship between individual privacy and the role of the state. Looking back at the
justifications canvassed above, and considering that privacy is necessary for the
exercise of other key human rights – such as the rights to freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion – any discussion of future privacy
regulation must assess the protection currently afforded to these related rights. Even
if it is concluded that there is no inevitable conflict between privacy and, say, national
security, there may be an argument for strengthening protection of the privacy right –
as we show in later chapters – on the grounds that it is essential to ensure freedom
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of speech even in times of heightened insecurity or political unrest. This argument is
closely related to the conception of privacy as a social and political value. Finally, it is
important to stress that any attempt to reform the law of privacy in the UK must begin
with the right to respect for private and family life contained in Article 8 of the ECHR.
The HRA not only incorporates this right into domestic law, but it also places an
obligation on the government to ensure that the information gathering and
surveillance activities of the state are consistent with Article 8, and that any
infringement of the right is in accordance with the law, properly justified, necessary,
and proportionate. Regardless of which theory of privacy we rely upon or how we
characterise the tension between the citizen and the state, it is important to
remember that the onus is always on the state to explain and justify why it should be
allowed to limit or infringe an individual’s privacy.
3.4 The future of privacy
It is difficult to foresee what the future might bring, and therefore what kind of legal
and other regulatory powers might be necessary to protect privacy and keep state
surveillance and information gathering in check. Some might argue that it is
inevitable that the modern state’s growing demand for information – coupled with the
development of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies such as body
scanning, facial recognition software, and automated data-mining tools – will
eventually result in a society in which privacy is a thing of the past. According to this
fatalistic view, any new laws aimed at enhancing existing privacy protections are
likely to fail, and as a consequence we should simply accept that ‘privacy is dead.’
In contrast, a more optimistic view of the expansion in surveillance and the
government’s demand for personal information focuses instead on the positive role
that technology can play in the development of public policy and business planning.
The previous Government’s ‘transformational’ agenda was in part based on this view.
It emphasised that improvement in the collection, processing, and sharing of
information within government did not necessarily have to come at the cost of
individual privacy if the proper safeguards are firmly in place. Although the promotion
of e-government is still in its relatively early stages, the state has not yet convincingly
shown that it can fulfil its public service aims while also protecting the right of privacy.
A succession of significant data losses in recent years has led many to question
government’s ability to manage large amounts of confidential information securely,
and to press for the enactment and enforcement of new laws to ensure that privacy is
properly protected.
Looking back over the last 40 years, however, there are also other reasons to be
optimistic about the future of privacy. Although privacy has come under considerable
pressure from government in recent years, at the same time there has been a
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gradual strengthening and harmonisation of information privacy and data protection
laws across Europe and beyond, and a growing level of public awareness about the
importance of privacy. In the UK, prominent regulators and NGOs, as well as some
political parties, have also repeatedly warned about the dangers of ‘sleepwalking into
a surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004), and have helped ensure that privacy remains on
the political agenda. Finally, in the last decade we have also seen the gradual
emergence of a jurisprudence of privacy in national and international courts, and an
increased willingness on the part of judges to favour the protection of privacy over
vague appeals to national security and the needs of law enforcement. Looked at from
this perspective, there is reason to believe that the ‘doomsday’ scenario can be
avoided if an effective legislative and regulatory framework can be established.
In trying to decide how to reconcile a commitment to privacy with the state’s growing
demand for information, it is important to steer a path between these various
optimistic and pessimistic accounts. Just as fatalists tend to have an overly
deterministic view of technology and fail to acknowledge that the law and other
means of regulation can do much to protect individual privacy, many optimists
struggle to explain exactly how a ‘balance’ can be struck between privacy and the
practical realities of the modern state. They also assume that progress is ratcheted
and cannot be reversed, gloss over existing inadequacies of legal and other controls,
and take for granted an ongoing political commitment to human rights and the
protection of privacy.
For our part, the authors of this report believe that, in order to produce a regulatory
framework capable of meeting the privacy challenges of the twenty-first century, it is
important to be clear about what it is we are trying to protect, and why it is important,
and to ensure that any new laws or regulatory mechanisms are able to be
implemented in practice. In addition, it is also important to ensure that any future
reforms are built on a solid and principled human rights foundation, and that existing
laws and regulatory structures are properly evaluated before any attempt is made to
amend or repeal them. These points will be considered throughout this report.
Regardless of whether one is optimistic or pessimistic about the future of privacy, it is
clear that the scale of the challenge ahead requires law-makers to move carefully,
and to avoid the fractured and piecemeal approach that has marred past attempts at
reform. Although this report does not address it, the question of how privacy can be
protected in single countries alone, without the international or global collaboration of
other forces aimed at the same goal, should also be on the agenda.
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3.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we have set out the main arguments in defence of information
privacy, and considered how the growing demands of the state – in particular, in
relation to national security, law enforcement, and citizens’ access to public services
– are likely to create new challenges to existing privacy laws and data protection
regimes. Several prominent and overlapping theories of privacy have influenced
existing approaches to regulation. It is necessary to take a context-specific approach
to issues of information privacy and to ensure that the approaches used enhance,
rather than undermine, the existing framework of rights and data protection in the UK.
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4.

Information privacy in the UK

4.1 Introduction
As is the case in many common law countries, information privacy in the UK is
governed by a wide variety of legal rules and regulations.14 As information
technologies and the demands of government have developed over time, however,
the law has struggled to strike a balance between protecting the privacy of individuals
and ensuring that the state and private organisations are able to acquire and process
personal information for legitimate purposes. In particular, there has been a distinct
tension between calls from the police and the security services – as well as
organisations responsible for health, education, social welfare, and transport – for
greater powers of surveillance and data collection, and an emerging public
awareness of the value of information privacy.
This section of the report provides a general overview of the major laws and legal
regulations that govern information privacy in the UK, as well as various informal
rules and guidelines that restrict the ability of public and private organisations to
collect and handle personal information.15 In an effort to ensure that this summary is
concise and accessible, specific sections of Acts and judicial decisions are cited
sparingly. It is also important to stress that this Chapter is not intended to provide a
comprehensive account or analysis of the relevant law. This has already been done
by a number of recent parliamentary and independent reviews, many of which are
cited in this report. Instead, the purpose of this Chapter is to identify areas in which
the protection of information privacy is either weak or in need of substantial reform.
4.2 Overview of the current law
At present, there is no single privacy statute or comprehensive ‘privacy law’ in the
UK. Instead, information privacy is protected through a combination of statutory
provisions, legal regulations, common law rules, and systems of informal regulation
(sometimes referred to as ‘soft law’). This section of the report concentrates on the
following main sources of information privacy protection in the UK:
•
•

The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998
The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998

•
•
•

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 200016
Common law protections and breach of confidence, and

•

Informal regulation, codes of practice, and other forms of ‘soft law’.17

For the sake of simplicity, these different sources of law are examined in this Chapter
under two broad headings: statutory protections and common law protections.
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Because it is difficult to understand the operation of guidelines, codes of practice,
and ‘soft law’ without also considering the role of regulators and alternative
approaches to the promotion of information privacy, these protections are discussed
in detail in Chapter 5.
4.3 Statutory protections
The Human Rights Act 1998
Prior to the enactment of the HRA, there was no established statutory or common
law right to privacy in the UK.18 Although individuals could appeal to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) if they believed that their right to respect for private
and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR had been infringed, the right could not be
directly relied upon in UK domestic courts. With the introduction of the HRA,
however, the ECHR became a part of domestic law, and a general right to respect for
private and family life under Article 8 was established in the UK:
(1)
(2)

Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

It is important to note that the ECtHR has acknowledged that the right to respect for
private and family life is ‘a broad right not susceptible to exhaustive definition’.19
Article 8 has been held to include elements such as the right to identity and personal
development, gender identification, sexual orientation, the right to develop and
establish relationships and be free from environmental pollution, as well as the more
traditional privacy rights such as the holding and dissemination of personal
information.
As a consequence of the incorporation of Article 8 into UK law, it is unlawful for a
public body to interfere with an individual’s privacy unless that interference is
authorised by one of the specific exceptions contained in Article 8(2). In practice, this
means that in addition to any other rules laid down by UK legislation or case law, any
public body that interferes with an individual’s privacy must be able to demonstrate
that the interference with the obligation to respect private and family life is:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Authorised by a law enacted by a democratic process
Proportionate to the purpose in question
Necessary for the functioning of a democratic society, and
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(4)

Conducted in accordance with one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8(2)
of the ECHR.

Since the HRA came into force on 2 October 2000, both the UK and European courts
have shown an unprecedented interest in questions of privacy. While cases such as
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] and Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] have
helped to clarify the scope of the right as it applies to individuals and private
organisations, decisions such as those handed down in Peck v UK (2003), Liberty v
UK (2008), and S. & Marper v UK (2008) have also recognised the restrictions the
ECHR and Article 8 places on the state.
In many respects, S. & Marper v UK (2008) provides a good example of the sorts of
obligations that Article 8 imposes on the state. In that case, both the applicants had
been required by the police to provide a DNA sample and have their fingerprints
taken: S at the age of 11 on arrest for an offence of which he was subsequently
acquitted; and Mr Marper on arrest in 2001 for an offence which was subsequently
dropped by the prosecution. The police later refused to destroy their DNA samples
and fingerprints. On appeal from the House of Lords, the ECtHR found a violation of
Article 8 as regards the retention of both the DNA sample and its profile and
fingerprints. According to the Court, the highly personal nature of a cellular sample
makes it data that needs to be protected. When considering the retention regimes in
other states, it noted that England and Wales and Northern Ireland are the only
jurisdictions within the Council of Europe to allow indefinite retention of fingerprint
and DNA material of any person of any age suspected of any recordable offence.
The Court made it clear that any state that takes a leading role in developing
scientific technologies to fight crime had a special responsibility for striking the right
balance between the competing public and private interests.
It is also important to note that the limits of the rights contained in Article 8 are
continually being questioned and tested by the courts. Depending on the
circumstances, for example, Article 8 can also cover activities carried out in public.
Recently, the ECtHR has held that in some circumstances photographs of an
individual in a public place, taken without consent or knowledge, can amount to an
interference with private life, as there is ‘a zone of interaction of a person with others,
even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life’.20
Although the ECHR is primarily concerned with limiting the power of the state to
interfere with individual rights – as in S. & Marper – it is also concerned with positive
obligations. Under the Convention, states are required to take positive steps or
measures to protect the Convention rights of individuals, particularly against
interference by others. In this regard, the Convention recognises that the acts of
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private individuals or bodies can threaten human rights just as much as the acts of
state authorities. It is important to note that many of the cases on ‘positive obligation’
have involved Article 8 rights, and have considered the question whether the state
has put in place a legal framework that effectively protects Convention rights. In light
of this, it can be argued that the HRA requires the government to do more than
simply respect an individual’s privacy. In addition, it has a duty to protect privacy and
provide effective regulatory safeguards.
In a similar vein, the requirement that any interference with Article 8 must be ‘in
accordance with the law’ goes beyond the bare requirement that there must be a
statutory or common law provision in place. Instead, it is essential that the law in
question is compatible with the rule of law, sufficiently circumscribed, and subject to
adequate legal safeguards. For example, it is well established that interference will
not be in accordance with the law if the impugned power is an arbitrary one.21
Finally, an essential ingredient of the Convention – and the operation of Article 8 – is
the right to an effective remedy under Article 13. Although the right is not specifically
included in the HRA, it can be argued that right should be available, as many of the
Tribunals responsible for regulating state surveillance activities are inaccessible to
the majority of complainants and bound by highly restrictive procedural rules.
Yet although the HRA and the Convention provide a rights-based framework for the
protection of information privacy in the UK, in practice the operation of Article 8 is
limited in a number of key ways. While the courts have made it clear in recent years
that the obligation to respect private and family life can apply to individuals and
organisations as well as the state,22 unfortunately this development is most likely to
benefit those who can afford to go to court to protect their privacy. As noted by the
privacy expert Dr Chris Pounder:
I am not confident that Article 8 will provide satisfactory jurisprudence
because there are very few cases going to the courts. Those cases that
tend to go into the courts primarily involve... people who have celebrity
status... Anybody who is trying to take an Article 8 case on has to take on
the unlimited resources of the state. (House of Lords 2009, para. 131)
As important as it is to ensure that individuals have an actionable right to privacy, it is
equally important to ensure that problems with access to justice do not exacerbate
the divide between privacy haves and privacy have-nots. If for no other reason, this is
a compelling reason for supplementing the protections provided by the HRA with
other rules and regulations aimed at preserving information privacy.
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Another major limitation to the right to respect for private and family life comes from
the broad range of exceptions listed in Article 8 itself. Although few would suggest
that privacy should be an absolute right – that is, a right which cannot be restricted in
any way, such as the prohibition on torture (Article 3) – the list of exceptions to Article
8 is extensive when compared with those typically attached to privacy rights in other
jurisdictions. In particular, the phrase ‘in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic wellbeing of the country’ is so broad as to allow a government
that is hostile to the privacy interests of individuals to curtail them severely. In
practice, governments are free to interpret these limitations very broadly, and are
rarely required to point to empirical evidence to support a call to restrict or infringe
information privacy.23 As a consequence, there is a danger that an over-reliance on
the HRA and Article 8 could leave information privacy particularly open to attack from
an unsympathetic government or public agency.
Finally, there is also the question whether it is reasonable or realistic to expect
government agencies and other public bodies properly to understand and adhere to
principles of necessity and proportionality when dealing with the rights set out in
Article 8. Although the ECHR is clear that any infringement of Article 8 must be both
necessary and proportionate to the legitimate interest being pursued, courts in the
UK and Europe have often struggled to provide clear guidance on the meaning and
scope of these terms.24 Clearly, bodies like the ECtHR play an important role in
helping to educate those within government and the public sector as to what
constitutes an unlawful infringement of the right to privacy. Yet despite the efforts of
the Commission and organisations like Liberty and JUSTICE, the complexity of
Article 8(2) and uncertainty as to its application remains a major problem for the
protection of information privacy in the UK.
The Data Protection Act 1998
In addition to protections provided by the HRA, information privacy and the use of
personal data in the UK is also regulated by the DPA, which replaced a 1984 Act of
the same name. The DPA itself was enacted as the UK’s transposition of the 1995
European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (European Union, 1995), a
landmark effort of the EU to bring Member States’ data protection laws into greater
harmony in terms of the practical implementation of rules based upon common
principles. Besides protecting personal data, the Directive also aimed to assist the
completion of the internal market in the EU through facilitating the ‘free movement of
personal data’ within the EU, and by establishing criteria for the transfer of personal
data to non-EU countries.
As the name suggests, the DPA is primarily concerned with the ‘processing’ of
personal data, where processing includes any use, disclosure, retention, storage,
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holding or collection of such data. However, not all forms of personal information are
personal data, and many manual (paper) files held in the private sector are not
subject to the Act. In relation to the public sector, all personal information is personal
data, but the protection afforded by the Act to personal information in manual files is
usually limited to the right of access to personal data and the correction of
inaccuracies.
The DPA sets out the circumstances under which such data can be processed by
both public authorities and private organisations. According to Schedule 1 of the
DPA, any individual or organisation engaged in the handling of personal data is
required to ensure that all such data are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Fairly and lawfully processed
Processed for limited purposes
Adequate, relevant and not excessive
Accurate and up to date
Not kept for longer than is necessary
Processed in line with rights of data subjects under the Act
Secure, and
Not transferred to other countries without adequate protection.

In practice, the first of these data protection principles – the requirement that the
processing of personal data be fair and lawful – aims to ensure that individuals and
organisations have legitimate reasons for collecting personal data, that they are open
with data subjects about how that information will be used, and that they do not do
anything unlawful with the data. In order to ensure that the storage and processing of
personal data are consistent with this principle and both open and transparent, the
Act establishes a system of notifications. Under this system, all organisations
engaged in the handling of personal information are not only required to provide
individuals with appropriate privacy notices when collecting their personal data, but
also to notify the ICO of their activity (unless they are exempt under the Act), and to
provide details of the type of data processing being undertaken (DPA ,1998, Part III).
This information is then published in the register of data controllers and is available
for public inspection. Failure to notify is a criminal offence under the Act. The general
purpose of this system is to ensure that members of the public are able to find out
who is processing personal information and for what purpose. In particular, the
system is designed to ensure that the ICO is informed when a data controller
processes personal data, and that the individuals concerned are made aware of the
processing and the purposes for which it is being undertaken.
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Because the DPA is fundamentally concerned with ensuring that organisations do not
process personal information improperly, the regime established by the Act not only
provides individuals with information rights that can be enforced by the courts, but
also enables anyone who believes that his or her personal information is being
improperly held or used to make a complaint to the ICO.25 According to the Act, the
Information Commissioner has the power to:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

Undertake assessments to ensure that public sector data controllers are
complying with the Act
Serve information notices requiring data controllers to provide the ICO with
specified information within a certain time period
Serve enforcement notices where there has been a breach of the Act, requiring
data controllers to take (or refrain from taking) specified steps in order to ensure
they comply with the law26
Prosecute those who commit criminal offences under the Act27
Conduct inspections to assess whether data controllers’ processing of personal
data complies with the law (with their consent, except in the case of central
government departments and some public authorities, where consent is not
needed), and
Report to Parliament annually or on data protection issues of particular concern
as they arise.

According to the Information Commissioner’s Annual Report for 2009–10, most
complaints brought under the DPA (52 per cent) are resolved informally. In the 17 per
cent of cases in which a decision notice was served, however, those notices were
only upheld by the Information Tribunal 23 per cent of the time, with the remaining
notices either being partially upheld (31 per cent) or not upheld (46 per cent). This
suggests that while the existing system of enforcement is working reasonably well on
an informal level, the Tribunal has not been especially willing to force individuals and
organisations to change their data processing practices.
Although it is clear that the DPA provides considerable protections for information
privacy, it nonetheless has serious limitations. In part, the problem is one of
definition. It can be argued, for example, that the definition of ‘sensitive data’ in the
DPA needs to be re-considered, particularly in relation to the increased use of
biometric data – fingerprints, retina and iris patterns, voice samples etc. – by the
state and private sector. As a result of the decision in S. & Marper, an actual DNA
sample, as well as any profile gained from the sample, must be regarded as personal
data. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the definition of personal information
contained in the Act can be stretched to provide the protection such data deserves.
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There is also the question of enforcement and compliance. Although the ICO’s
enforcement powers were recently expanded so that it can now order organisations
to pay fines of up to £500,000 for serious breaches of the DPA, in general its powers
remain relatively limited when compared with regulators in some other jurisdictions.28
For example, although the Information Commissioner now has the power to inspect
government departments and certain public authorities, private sector inspections
can only be carried out with the permission of the relevant data controller. As the
House of Lords noted in 2009, the need for permission limits the ability of the ICO to
protect information privacy and undermines the deterrent power of the DPA (House
of Lords, 2009, para. 232). In contrast, in the Republic of Ireland the DPA grants the
Irish Data Protection Commissioner much stronger inspection powers,29 and the
power to conduct routine audits of data controllers, with or without their permission.
In addition to granting relatively limited enforcement powers to the ICO, the DPA also
sets out a broad range of exemptions. Under Part IV of the Act, for example, when an
individual’s personal data is being held and processed for the purpose of
safeguarding national security, the general data protection principles do not apply,
nor do the data subject rights or other obligations laid down in Parts II, III, or V. In
some cases much narrower, key exemptions also exist regarding matters of crime
and taxation, and in relation to issues of health, education and social work. While the
Act sets out the conditions under which these exemptions can be invoked, in the
case of national security in particular, the decision as to whether the personal data in
question is covered by the Act rests with either a Minister of the Crown or the
Secretary of State. Given that one of the reasons for regulating the collection and
processing of personal data is to protect individuals from unwanted or overzealous
state surveillance, it can be argued that providing elected officials with such broad
powers substantially undermines both the effectiveness and the symbolic value of the
regime as a whole.
Finally, it is important to note that the DPA is primarily concerned with questions of
data collection and processing, and not information privacy per se. Indeed, it is
significant that the word ‘privacy’ does not appear anywhere in the text of the DPA.
As a result, even if the limitations identified in this section were addressed, it is
unlikely that the Act could provide the level of protection for information privacy
needed in light of the threats discussed in earlier chapters of this report. Although
there has been considerable debate over what constitutes personal data for the
purposes of the Act, it is clear that the term is much narrower than the idea of private
information, or the meaning of privacy, as discussed earlier in this report. As a result,
it is difficult to see how the DPA – even if substantially amended – could by itself
provide the basis for a more comprehensive framework for the protection of
information privacy in the UK.
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Personal data protection in the European Union – proposals for reform
As stated above, the DPA came about to give domestic effect to the landmark EU
data protection directive. However, after 15 years, the European Commission has
brought forth a communication outlining steps to develop a more comprehensive and
coherent legislative framework, to protect individuals' data, including a revised
Directive requiring national legislative changes.30 The Commission will propose
legislation in 2011 aimed at revising the legal framework for data protection with the
objective of strengthening the EU's stance in protecting the personal data of the
individual in the context of all EU policies, including law enforcement and crime
prevention, taking into account the specificities of these areas. Non-legislative
measures, such as encouraging self-regulation and exploring the feasibility of EU
privacy seals, will be pursued in parallel. This revision is intended to correct
deficiencies in the original and in national transpositions in the light of experience
with implementation, and of new, globalising developments in the world of
information processing, and reverse the drifting apart of national approaches that had
occurred over this period of time. Individuals’ fundamental rights would be
strengthened, especially their right to the protection of personal data. It would
enhance individuals’ control over their data, including rights of access, rectification
and deletion, and provide greater transparency. These enhancements would be in
keeping with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,31 which repeats the older right
to a private and family life but also adds a right to the protection of personal data.
The UK government to date has been cautious in its approach to the proposed
reforms. However, the discussions around new EU proposals and the implementation
of any subsequent EU legislation at the national level, together with non-legislative
measures, will provide an important opportunity to update and enhance individual
data protection measures.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000
As has been mentioned earlier in this report, in order for individuals to be able to
protect their privacy and maintain control over their personal information, they must
be able to know how that information is being used. While the DPA regulates access
to personal information, the major piece of legislation governing the access to
information generally in England and Wales (and for some Scottish bodies) is the
FOIA, which came into force in January 2005; Scotland has a separate but largely
comparable Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act (FOISA) 2002. Under the Act,
individuals have a right to request information held by a public authority, provided
that it does not directly pertain to them (the right to personal information being
provided by the DPA 1998). Requests can be made either by letter or email, and
according to the Act the public authority must inform the applicant whether it in fact
holds that information – and supply it if also requested – within 20 working days.
Crucially, the Act is retroactive and as a result applies to all government departments
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and publicly funded bodies and all information held by them. Although the FOIA is the
responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, it is administered and enforced by the ICO,
with decisions about its application and the implications of breach being dealt with by
the Information Tribunal. Regulation under the Scottish Act is the responsibility of the
Scottish Information Commissioner.
In many respects, the introduction of the FOIA marked a significant development in
the protection of information privacy in the UK. By extending the rights of access
already established under the DPA, the Act has helped to make government and
public sector data use more open and transparent. Yet while the FOIA has a broad
ambit, the obligations placed on public authorities by the Act are – in common with
the DPA – subject to a wide range of exemptions. These exemptions are listed in
Part II of the Act and include information that is required for safeguarding national
security (section 24(1)), information that might prejudice the prevention or detection
of crime (section 31(1)(a)), and information that may endanger the physical or mental
health of any individual (section 38(1)(a)). Significantly, the FOIA also creates two
exemptions for personal data about the applicant. The first applies if the applicant is
the data subject; then the appropriate mechanism for acquiring such personal data is
via the subject access right of the DPA. If the applicant is not the data subject, then
the public authority has to assess whether publication of the personal data (via
disclosure under the FOI regime) would breach a data protection Principle. If it does
breach a Principle, then the personal data cannot be accessed by the requester, and
the privacy of the data subject is maintained. In contrast, in Scotland the test for
release of personal data under the FOISA centres on whether the public interest in
disclosure outweighs the public interest in exempting the data from disclosure. A
further limitation to the effectiveness of FOI has been the limited number of
organisations to which it applies. Some key bodies, such as the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO), have not been subject to its provisions, although the
Government now plans to include them.
It is important to note that both the DPA and FOI regimes have to deal with the vexed
question of what constitutes ‘personal data’; clarity on this point has been more often
aided by rulings under the freedom of information regimes. When viewed in
combination with the DPA, the FOIA helps to increase the transparency of public
bodies and makes it more difficult for them to engage in unauthorised forms of
surveillance and personal data collection as information about these activities can be
the subject of requests for information (for example, policies towards surveillance).
For example, under the FOIA an individual could request information about future
government plans routinely to monitor personal emails, and then make a request
under the DPA to determine whether their own email has actually been monitored
(assuming none of the various exceptions apply in either case).
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The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
Introduced as a replacement for the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and
parts of the Police Act 1977, RIPA – and RIPSA, its counterpart in Scotland –
governs the exercise of surveillance powers by the police and other public bodies. In
essence, RIPA was enacted to ensure that the exercise of these surveillance powers
does not infringe upon the right to respect for private and family life contained in the
HRA, and the Act contains a wide range of provisions covering such diverse activities
as the interception of communications, wiretapping, and the surveillance of private,
semi-private, and public spaces. Because the rules relating to each of these areas
are extensive and often highly complex, it is beyond the scope of this report to
provide anything more than a basic summary of the relevant provisions, with a
particular focus on the implications for information privacy in each case.
In simple terms, RIPA helps to protect information privacy in two key ways. First, it
establishes a regulatory framework for the interception of communications by the
police, and second, it limits the circumstances in which the police can undertake
surveillance of private residences or individuals in public. As regards the interception
of communications, the key provision of RIPA is section 1(1), which makes it a crime
for anyone to intercept a communication that takes place over a public network
without lawful authority.32 Given that telephone calls, posted mail, email, and
voicemail are all regarded as things capable of being intercepted under the Act, on its
face section 1(1) provides considerable protection for information privacy, However,
according to section 5(3) of the Act, the Secretary of State can issue a warrant
empowering the police to intercept a communication provided the surveillance
proposed is proportionate, necessary, and:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

In the interests of national security
For the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime
For the purpose of safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom,
or
For the purpose, in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be
equivalent to those in which he would issue a warrant by virtue of paragraph (b),
of giving effect to the provisions of any international mutual assistance
agreement.

Although the legislative regime as regards the interception of communications is
generally clear, some questions remain unresolved. Interestingly, it has been held
that the unintended monitoring of a mobile phone call by the police – as a result, for
example, of that mobile phone coming within range of a covert surveillance device
being used for some other purpose – does not constitute an interception provided the
call is not recorded.33 Given that this data would not be personal data under section 1
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of the DPA (as it is not ‘recorded’), there is no obvious remedy available to an
individual whose privacy has been violated in this way. Equally curious is the fact that
information obtained by foreign authorities outside of the UK is admissible as
evidence provided it was intercepted lawfully in that jurisdiction.34 Why such evidence
should be admitted – when equally lawful evidence obtained domestically is not – is
unclear.
In terms of information privacy, it is also important to distinguish between surveillance
carried out on a private communications network and that undertaken on a public
network. According to section 4 of RIPA, any organisation (including public
authorities) can lawfully intercept telephone calls or emails made on their own private
network provided the interception is for the purpose of monitoring the conduct of their
business. Given that many people communicate through private networks, this
exception to the general prohibition contained in section 1 constitutes a serious gap
in the protection of information privacy. Furthermore, under section 1(6) a person or
organisation in control of a private communications network may have lawful
authority to intercept and monitor calls and emails, provided the users of that system
have given their consent, either explicitly or implicitly (for example, by accepting such
monitoring as one of the terms of their employment).35
In addition to the general privacy restrictions imposed by Article 8 of the ECHR, RIPA
also governs much of the surveillance of private, semi-private, and public spaces.
Not only does the Act set out the circumstances under which certain public
authorities – most notably the police – can engage in surveillance activities, it also
provides a framework for the authorisation and review of those activities by the Office
of the Surveillance Commissioner (OSC). According to section 48(2) of the Act,
surveillance is defined as:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their
conversations or their other activities or communications
Recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of
surveillance, and
Surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.

Under the Act, surveillance may be defined as directed or intrusive, and this definition
has implications for whether a particular type of surveillance can be authorized.
Although the definitions of directed and intrusive surveillance are somewhat
confusing, it is possible to define them as follows:
Surveillance is directed if:
(1) It comprises covert observation or monitoring by whatever means
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(2)
(3)

It is for the purpose of a specific investigation or specific operation (any crime or
other offence), and
It will or is likely to obtain private information about any person, not just the
subject of the operation.

Surveillance is intrusive if:
(1) It is covert
(2) It is carried out on any residential property or in any private vehicle, and
(3) It involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the vehicle, or the
use of a surveillance device.36
It is worth noting that the structure of these definitions is in many ways typical of the
Act. Although RIPA is now the primary means by which police surveillance is
regulated in the UK – and is therefore legislation that most police officers are
required to be familiar with – in many places it is poorly drafted and its overall
structure is far from clear. Although legislative clarity is something that should be
strived for in all areas of the law, it can be argued that it is particularly important
where fundamental rights such as the right to privacy are at stake.
Generally speaking, where an individual’s residence or vehicle is placed under covert
surveillance, that surveillance will be regarded as intrusive for the purposes of the
Act. As a consequence, the police can only place an individual’s home under
surveillance once they have obtained authorisation from the OSC.37 Difficulties arise,
however, in cases where it is unclear whether a building or some other private space
constitutes a residence for the purposes of the Act. Equally problematic is the
situation where an individual who is being followed under a directed surveillance
authorisation enters a residence. Under the provisions of RIPA, it seems clear that
intrusive surveillance authorisation would be required, although this can be granted
by an authorising officer under section 36(3) prior to approval being gained from the
OSC if the matter is deemed to be sufficiently urgent. Such examples highlight the
ambiguities created by the distinction the Act draws between directed and intrusive
surveillance. Although many police forces advise their officers and authorising
officers to take a conservative approach to surveillance – and to seek approval for
intrusive surveillance whenever they are in doubt – the current system of
authorisation still leaves open the possibility of serious errors and the inadvertent use
of otherwise illegal surveillance techniques.
Where covert surveillance is being undertaken by the police or a public authority in a
public place (such as a street or a park), the question of whether RIPA authorisation
is required will depend on whether the surveillance in question can be categorised as
either directed or intrusive. For example, according to paragraph 1.4 of the Covert
37

PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY

Surveillance Code of Practice, the police must obtain a surveillance authorisation if
they intend to use an existing public area CCTV system as part of a pre-planned
surveillance operation.38 As a consequence, the police cannot simply take control of
a CCTV camera in order to follow a particular individual or vehicle, unless that
surveillance is part of the day-to-day operation of the system.
As has already been noted in this report, the growing use of public area CCTV
systems constitutes one of the major threats to information privacy in the UK.
Although the vast majority of CCTV schemes operating in the UK have their own
codes of practice (often based on the CCTV Code issued by the ICO), as will be
discussed in the next chapter these informal codes are not legally binding and do not
confer any rights on individuals who have been made the subject of unwarranted
public area surveillance (other than a limited right of access to the images recorded).
As a consequence, although a code may prohibit operators from following an
individual unless it is for a particular purpose (such as the prevention of crime), if the
surveillance is not recorded then an individual who feels they have been unjustly
targeted has no obvious remedy under the law.
In part, this situation arises because the law does not generally protect privacy rights
in public places. Although once an individual’s activities are recorded and issues of
data protection come into play, the current law does not regard the mere observation
of an individual in public as an infringement of their Article 8 right to privacy.39 It can
be argued, however, that even observation without recording can seriously infringe
upon an individual’s privacy in public, insofar as an important aspect of that privacy is
the ability to act anonymously and without fear of being watched. This is a point that
has been stressed by the Council of Europe, which stated in 2007 that:
Video surveillance of public areas by public authorities or law enforcement
agencies can constitute an undeniable threat to fundamental rights such
as the right to privacy... and [to the individual’s] right to benefit from
specific protection regarding personal data collected by such
surveillance... it is recommended that specific regulations should be
enacted at both international and national level in order to cover the
specific issue of video surveillance by public authorities of public areas as
a limitation of the right to privacy. (European Commission for Democracy
Through Law (Venice Commission) 2007, paras. 79 and 81)
Furthermore, the fact that individuals may be subjected to routine surveillance
without their knowledge – as is the case where public area CCTV cameras are covert
– may have a significant ‘chilling effect’ on free speech and militate against the use of
public spaces for political gatherings or protest activities. Although a statutory regime
to regulate CCTV was called for by the House of Lords (House of Lords, 2009, para.
219), the Committee’s recommendation was not accepted by the Government at the
38

INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE UK

time.40 The current Government has, however, indicated that it may support a
statutory system of CCTV regulation, although at the time of writing no further details
or timeframe had been announced.
Returning to the operation of RIPA, it is clear that although the regulatory regime it
establishes is designed to ensure that the use of police surveillance is consistent with
the rights set out in Article 8 of the ECHR, this regime suffers from a number of major
shortcomings. First and foremost, because the legislation is extremely complex, there
has been considerable confusion within the ranks of the police as to its scope and
application. According to a Review of RIPA commissioned by ACPO in 2004, the
legislation is marred by ambiguity, and its chief provisions are open to a variety of
interpretations. This problem is compounded by the fact that RIPA also preserves
(with amendments) Part 111 of the Police Act – which deals with interference with
property – and the Intelligence Services Act 1984. As a result, it has led to the
development of what ACPO regard as an unnecessary level of bureaucracy and a
lack of clear guidance for Senior Investigating Officers.
This is a view that has been echoed by the courts. The Court of Appeal has, for
example, labelled RIPA ‘a particularly puzzling statute’ (R v W [2003] EWCA Crim
1632). Similarly, Lord Bingham in the House of Lords described the Act as
‘perplexing’, and noted that ‘the trial judge and the Court of Appeal found it difficult to
‘construe the provisions of the Act with confidence, and the House has experienced
the same difficulty’.41 As mentioned earlier, it should also be noted that the Act has
given rise to an unprecedented number – over 30 – statutory instruments, which now
have to be consulted in order fully to understand its remit and powers.42
Organisations such as Liberty and JUSTICE have also repeatedly expressed
concerns over the system of authorisation established under RIPA, and the fact that
it is not subject to direct judicial oversight. This is a point that was emphasised by Dr
Eric Metcalfe in his evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution:
RIPA powers are often self-authorising with lower level communications
data powers being authorised internally and even the highest level
interception powers only requiring the authority of a government minister.
This can be contrasted with the USA where, historically, there has always
been independent judicial authorisation at the heart of the US surveillance
process. (House of Lords, 2009, para. 160)
Indeed, the fact that authorisation for surveillance activities is done ‘internally’
continues to be a concern for the courts. In the case of Re McE [2009], for example,
the House of Lords held that internal authorisation was inappropriate where the
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surveillance interferes with legal professional privilege – in effect saying that such
circumstances are as sensitive as when surveillance is conducted in a home or
private vehicle (Re McE [2009] UKHL 15).
A further concern has been the growing use of RIPA powers by local authorities.
According to the Interception of Communications Commissioner (2010), in 2008
public bodies made 525,130 requests for communications data under RIPA, with
1,765 of these being made by local authorities (Interception of Communications
Commissioner, 2010 ,pp. 8 and 15). Given that there is evidence to suggest that
many local authorities lack the expertise needed to interpret the provisions of the Act,
these statistics are worrying. As noted by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner
(2008, pp.12-13), local authorities tend to resort to covert activity as a last resort but
when they do they ‘have a tendency to expose lack of understanding of the
legislation’ and there is a ‘serious misunderstanding of the concept of proportionality’.
This has led to a number of high profile instances of what Big Brother Watch – an
NGO concerned with issues of privacy in UK – has referred to as abuses of the Act
(Big Brother Watch, 2010). Notable examples of such abuses include the use of
RIPA powers to:
•

Monitor local authority employees, and to investigate concerns over car parking,
work times, and sick pay

•

Spy on dog owners and enforce rules against dog fouling

•
•

Catch individuals suspected of breaking the smoking ban, and
Prevent illegal fly tipping.

These problems are compounded by the fact that there are also several other
statutes that give local authorities and other public bodies the power to access
communications data: the Social Security Administration Act 1992; the Charities Act
1993; and the Environmental Protection Act 1990. As noted by Liberty (2010, pp.701):
Having powers spread across the statute book also means appropriate
supervision and safeguards are diluted and it increases the likelihood that
personal data is being accessed inappropriately.43
Although RIPA does provide a level of protection for information privacy in the UK, as
is the case with the DPA, the regulatory framework it establishes is clearly
characterised by a number of serious gaps, deficiencies, and legislative exceptions.
In addition, because it does not seek to regulate the general use of public area
surveillance technologies such as CCTV, it only partially strengthens the right to
respect for private and family life contained in Article 8 of the ECHR, and fails to
address one of the key threats to information privacy in the UK.
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Finally, there is the question whether the definitions of surveillance contained in RIPA
will be able to respond to continuing developments in information technology, social
networking, and online communication. Does, for example, identifying the websites
an individual has accessed constitute surveillance? Does RIPA regulate the
monitoring of chat room discussions by undercover police officers?44 If the police do
not use technical methods to gain access to a Facebook page, but instead do so by
way of a ‘fake’ online identity, does this require authorisation?45 Given that an
essential part of privacy is the ability to control access to one’s information, it can be
argued that the use of electronic or other measures to circumvent access controls
and privacy settings is a form of surveillance that should require authorisation.
Other statutory privacy protections and limitations on the sharing of personal
information
At present there is no general statutory power that permits public bodies to share
data, and as such according to the principles of administrative law, public bodies can
disclose personal information only if they have been granted the power to do so by
statute. Although this restriction may appear to be clear, difficulties arise when it is
possible to infer a power to share information from some other explicit statutory
power. For example, according to section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972,
local authorities have the power to do anything that will facilitate, or is conducive or
incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions.46 Given that it is an accepted
principle of administrative law that express powers should be interpreted in such a
way as to authorise actions that are incidental to them, it is easy to see how a local
authority may regard itself as authorised to share various forms of personal
information with other government bodies. Although any such sharing must comply
with the rules established under the DPA and the principles of the HRA, the fact that
there is no specific regime that regulates the sharing of personal information within
government is cause for concern.47 Not only can the absence of clear, uniform rules
lead to variances in practice, it is also impossible for individuals to know with any
degree of certainty the conditions under which personal information held about them
might be shared.48
The position as regards data sharing is even less clear when it comes to actions of
government departments. As is the case with public bodies, a government
department is only permitted to share personal data if it is authorised to do so by law.
This legal authority may come from statute but also from the common law or the royal
prerogative. As the Ministry of Justice (then the Department of Constitutional Affairs)
acknowledged in 2003 in its guidance on public sector data sharing (DCA, 2003), the
law in this area is complex, and it may be possible for a government department to
share data based on the common law or royal prerogative even if a power to share
data cannot be reasonably implied from some explicit statutory provision.
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In addition to the rules of breach of confidence and administrative law, there are a
range of other statutory provisions that prohibit the disclosure of certain types of
information by public bodies and government departments. For the most part, these
are based on obligations of confidence and include (DCA, 2003, Section 5, para. 6):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Medical confidentiality, according to the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 and
the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988
Information supplied in connection with legal proceedings, according to the
established rules of court
Health and safety, according to sections 27 and 28 of the Health and Safety at
Work Etc Act 1974
Information provided to the Inland Revenue under section 182 of the Finance
Act 1989 and section 6 and Schedule 1 to the Taxes Management Act 1970
Information passed to the Child Support Agency as required by section 50 of
the Child Support Act 1991
The Human Tissue Act 2004, and
Information obtained through the exercise of powers under the Companies Act
2006.

In addition, there are two other notable situations in which public bodies may be
permitted to share personal information with either another such body or a
government department. The first of these arises under section 115 of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998, which gives the power to disclose information when the disclosure
is necessary or expedient for the purposes of that Act. This is an extremely broad
provision, and while any such disclosure will be subject to the provisions of the DPA
and the principles of the HRA, it provides a wide-reaching statutory basis for data
sharing between public bodies. Similar powers are also provided by section 17 of the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. According to that section, personal
information can be disclosed provided such a disclosure is connected with a criminal
investigation or prosecution. While section 17(5) requires that the public body in
question ensures that the relevant disclosure is proportionate to the legitimate aim
being pursued (as per the requirements of the HRA and Article 8 of the ECHR), when
it can be demonstrated that the disclosure or sharing is in fact proportionate, there
can be no action for breach of confidence.
Although there is a considerable body of legislation governing the sharing of personal
information, it is nonetheless extremely difficult for individuals to determine when and
under what circumstances information about them has been disclosed. While the
DPA gives individuals the right to know what information is held about them, it does
not explicitly require individuals or organisations to disclose whether that information
has been shared. As a consequence, even if individuals are able to ascertain that a
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particular organisation holds personal or confidential information about them, they
cannot be certain that the information in question has not been passed on. This lack
of transparency represents a significant flaw in the current regulatory framework and
potentially undermines many of the advances made by both the DPA and the HRA in
terms of the protection of information privacy.
4.4 Common law protections
In addition to the general right to respect for private and family life provided by the
HRA and the various statutory provisions and rules surrounding the collection,
storage and processing of personal information, the common law also offers
individuals a degree of privacy protection through the tort of breach of confidence.49
Although the majority of cases in which breach of confidence is likely to be raised
centre on disputes over trade secrets or government information, it is well
established that the action is also available where the information in question is
personal or non-commercial in nature. As a consequence, where an individual’s
personal information has been passed to a third party without his or her consent,
then an action for breach of confidence may be available, provided the court is
satisfied that the information in question was of a private or confidential nature.50 In
addition, following the decision of Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22,
there may also be recourse to action for ‘misuse of private information’.
Although it has been argued that the courts should go further and develop a new tort
of privacy based on principles drawn from the law of breach of confidence, there are
considerable problems associated with such an approach. First and foremost, there
is a danger that – because of the high cost of civil litigation and the fact that legal aid
is rarely available for private actions – any new tort of privacy will only be accessible
to the wealthy. In addition, it is unclear as to what sorts of compensation would be
available in such cases, particularly where the individual does not have a
commercially valuable reputation to protect or has not suffered physical damage or
psychological harm as a result of the privacy invasion. Finally, there is also danger
that judicial activism in this area will only serve to make the existing law even more
fragmented, and undermine the case for improved statutory regulation. Moreover,
judicial activism is necessarily jurisdiction-specific. As a consequence, while the law
may develop through the courts in England, this does not necessarily lead to legal
change in Scotland or Northern Ireland, with the result that protection in the UK
becomes further fragmented. For all of these reasons, although it may be tempting to
look to the courts for greater protection of information privacy, it is clear that the
common law cannot provide the sort of overarching and coherent privacy framework
that is currently needed in the UK.
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4.5 Guidelines, codes of practice, and ‘soft law’
In addition to the laws discussed above, and other statutory measures, there are also
significant elements of ‘soft law’, including codes of practice and guidance issued by
regulators and other bodies. These instruments vary in their degree of formality and
binding force, and represent an important part of the overall regulation and protection
of information privacy in the UK. Given the close relationship between the operation
of ‘soft law’ and the role of regulators, these protections are discussed in detail in the
next chapter, which focuses on alternative approaches to the protection and
promotion of information privacy.
4.6
Weaknesses of the current approach
Although information privacy is protected by a wide range of laws and regulations in
the UK, the current regime suffers from a number of significant weaknesses. First,
because the law has tended to develop in an irregular and largely sporadic fashion,
there are substantial gaps in the information privacy protections offered to individual
citizens. This is due to the fact that legal reform in this area is typically reactive in
character, with the law responding to rapid and often unexpected changes in both the
technological and political landscape of privacy, surveillance, and data sharing. For
example, concerns about the protection of information privacy in the context of
advanced computer technology were behind many of the regulatory provisions
introduced by the DPA and RIPA. However, in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7, the
expansion of data-monitoring powers has been the focus of a great deal of legislative
activity. In particular, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 undermines
both of the earlier pieces of legislation in a number of key respects, most notably as
regards the obligations of internet service providers to retain records of internet use.
Equally, although concern about the widespread use of CCTV has increased in
recent years, public area surveillance remains relatively unregulated when compared
to other, similarly intrusive forms of state surveillance and information gathering. As a
result of this reactive approach, the overall system of surveillance and data collection
regulation that has emerged in the UK is at times internally inconsistent, and could
best be described as piecemeal. Furthermore, because the law has struggled to keep
pace with the expansion of surveillance in the UK, the resources and powers granted
to regulators have begun to look increasingly inadequate in light of the challenges
they face.
Secondly, the rules and regulations that govern information privacy and the use of
personal information are not based on any single rationale or set of stated principles.
In part, this is a result of the fact that these laws have developed through a
combination of case law, legislation, and informal attempts at self-regulation. The
absence of clearly defined, overarching principles means that each piece of
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legislation, line of judicial precedent, or code of practice has to be understood and
interpreted within its own specific context. This can make the task of determining
what rules apply to any given form of surveillance or data collection complex and
time-consuming, and increases the likelihood that individuals will have their privacy
infringed or their personal data misused.
Finally, due to its diverse and de-centralised nature, no single body or individual is
responsible for protecting information privacy in the UK, or for overseeing the system
of surveillance and data collection regulation in the UK. At present, the ICO, the
OSC, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, the Scottish Information
Commissioner, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the various directors
of the security services, and the Secretary of State all share responsibility for
monitoring and regulating surveillance practices and technologies, and/or for
ensuring that information privacy is respected by the organisations within their
jurisdiction. While there is some communication between these bodies, there is little
evidence to suggest that there is much inter-agency coordination, either in terms of
oversight of surveillance practices or the administration and enforcement of penalties
for non-compliance. As a result, it is difficult to assess whether information privacy is
being adequately protected, or whether there are substantial gaps in the legal regime
that need to be filled by new laws or regulations.
4.7
Summary
This section has provided a brief overview of the various statues, regulations, and
common law rules that govern individual privacy and the use of personal information
in the UK. Although it is difficult to generalise about such a diverse and complex area
of law, it is possible to identify a number of key trends in the recent development of
privacy laws in the UK. While it is true that the HRA, the DPA, the FOIA, and RIPA –
and the Scottish versions of the last two – have brought about significant changes in
the way in which government and public authorities think about information privacy, it
is clear that more attention needs to be paid to ensuring greater consistency in the
way in which information privacy issues are understood and strengthening the legal
regime and the powers of the regulatory agencies responsible for enforcing existing
laws and regulations.
Another trend that has implications for the protection of information privacy in the UK
is the continuing expansion in the surveillance apparatus of the state – most notably
on the grounds of national security, prevention of crime, and public sector efficiency.
Given that this expansion has been accompanied by only a relatively small increase
in the powers or resources available to regulatory authorities such as the ICO or the
various surveillance commissioners, the question arises as to whether the existing
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system of information privacy protections is being properly enforced, or is indeed
adequate.
Finally, there appears to be a continuing reluctance on the part of government to
consider the possibility of widespread reform of the existing law so as to rationalise
the existing piecemeal structure and create a single, comprehensive regulatory
framework for surveillance and data collection.
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5.

Complementary approaches for enhancing privacy

5.1 Introduction
General or sector-specific privacy law is necessary, but not sufficient for privacy
protection. To ensure compliance, laws depend on the efforts of a regulatory agency
such as a data protection authority and other mechanisms operating within a legal
framework across society, in government and in business organisations. Measures
that complement statutory or common-law mechanisms have developed over many
years as additions to the array of instruments for personal data protection. Some
would argue that they are more effective than legal instruments and are more
sensitive to the variety of information contexts and practices. Others remain
suspicious that these instruments can only weaken protection, especially if they
substitute for law. This Chapter examines some leading complementary approaches
and assesses their contribution to the aim of protecting privacy and human rights.
These approaches include codes of practice, privacy-enhancing tools and modes of
evaluation that are built into the design of information systems, and the raising of
public awareness. Our aim is to describe these instruments and point out their strong
and weak points. We begin with a general explanation before examining the UK
situation.
5.2 Self-regulatory approaches
The wide range of self-regulatory instruments cannot be discussed here.51 However,
amongst the most important are codes of practice or conduct and standards. They
are derived from a general data protection law and usually operate in an informationgovernance context within public or private organisations. With the recognition that
statutory law may be inadequate to protect information privacy by itself, codes have
come to be regarded with greater favour by data protection policy-makers as
adjuncts to legal regulation. Sometimes, however, codes of practice exist in the
absence of specific or sectoral law governing information practices, as in the USA,
which lacks an omnibus data protection law. In some countries – the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Canada and the UK provide examples – codes or
standards play a more integral part of a statutory regime and may be overseen by the
regulatory body.
The strength of data-protection codes, as of other self-regulatory instruments, lies
largely in their tailoring of general legal provisions or ethical precepts to the
circumstances of an industrial or business sector (for example, banking), a
technology (for example, smart cards), a profession (for example, market
researchers), or a process (for example, direct marketing). Privacy protection and –
where it exists – the law are thus more likely to be understood in the concrete terms
current in these sectors. It is more likely to address the specific contexts in which
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individuals’ personal data is processed. The process of developing a code in
conjunction with the advice of interested parties and regulators may be valuable in
helping data controllers appreciate the importance of protecting the privacy of their
customers or clients. Going further, context-specific guidance based on a code can
be a useful way of getting managers or employees to implement the fine grain of
privacy protection.
However, codes have been controversial because they have often been encouraged
by industries that aim to forestall legislation and who prefer self-regulation to more
rigorous regulation by statute; they see codes as a less onerous substitute for law
(US Department of Commerce, 1997). Privacy advocates have therefore distrusted
self-regulation as a weak form of privacy protection, because it is often perfunctory
and symbolic, rather than implemented with force. Where codes are adopted
reluctantly or as a means of regulatory avoidance, they may be a poor substitute for
rigorously enforced law. In addition, a code’s mechanisms for redress, transparency,
and sanctions may be wanting, and the ability of a trade association or other ‘peak’
organisation – or indeed, a public sector agency – to discipline its member
organisations, companies, professionals or other staff may be limited.
Therefore, under these conditions self-regulation is unlikely to adhere to privacyprotection principles unless it takes place within a statutory regime. Moreover, if data
controllers are not organised into sectors or industries, there is no overarching
organisation capable of adopting a code that would bind or influence controllers’
information-processing activities. Whether the state functions as a single entity or, in
reality, as a collection of separate organisations, may have an important bearing on
the usefulness of public sector codes. An important question for this country could be
whether each central government agency or department should adopt its own code
of practice pertaining to its functions; whether there should be one for all of them,
perhaps ‘owned’ by the Cabinet Office; or whether there should be a central push
and oversight with responsibility and further ‘tailoring’ resting on each organisation.
In the UK, a prominent role was envisaged for codes of practice in the 1978 Lindop
Report that preceded the passage of the first UK data protection legislation.52 Lindop
explored options for creating a system of some 50 codes having the force of law and
as a main activity of an independent data protection authority. In the event,
subsequent UK data protection legislation did not go down this route – partly
because it challenged Ministerial powers – but since then there has been a
development of codes and their incorporation as parts of the regulatory regime.
Codes are integral to the UK data protection regime but have played perhaps a less
conspicuous role than elsewhere. Some codes have originated within sectors or
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organisations themselves, public or private, while others are promulgated by the ICO
following consultation, as is explained below. Among the codes are those for the
sharing of personal data (currently being revised; see below), employment, the fair
processing of telecommunications directory information, privacy notices, police
forces, online privacy, ICO assessment audits, and CCTV. The Audit Commission
adopted a statutory Code of Data Matching Practice in 2008, applicable to its
National Fraud Initiative, and Audit Scotland was consulting on one in 2010. Also
bearing upon privacy are the codes of practice that fall under RIPA, for the
interception of communications, acquisition and disclosure of communications data,
covert surveillance and property interference, covert human intelligence, and for the
investigation of protected electronic information. The Scottish Government has been
developing a central set of principles for identity-management systems. This is a type
of code complementing the data protection principles in the context of identity
management as a specific kind of information use, although with wider applicability.
Section 51 of the DPA requires the Information Commissioner ‘to promote the
following of good practice by data controllers’. This includes activity with regard to
codes of practice, whether the code is ordered by the Secretary of State – a
Government Minister – or whether the Commissioner considers it appropriate to
prepare and disseminate one. In the former case, the Commissioner lays the draft
code before each House of Parliament. In the latter case, he must consult with trade
associations and data subjects or their representatives before issuing the code. But
he may also encourage trade associations to prepare and disseminate a code, giving
an opinion on it following consultation.
The coverage that codes provide for areas of potentially privacy-invasive information
practices is patchy, and the development of a more comprehensive framework for
their development and implementation has been slow. Codes may have a number of
shortcomings, including a lack of clear terminology, uncertainty about the intended
audience, and ambiguity about the relationship between encouraging good practice
and requiring legal compliance. The code may be imprecisely tailored to the
circumstances of different data controllers, and may leave unclear the relationship
between the code and other guidance that relates to data controllers. Moreover,
public reassurance that a code is obeyed may be unwarranted. While some codes
are relatively straightforward in applying data protection principles (for example, the
ACPO code for police forces), others are very – if necessarily – complex in their
coverage (for example, the employment practices code).
The effectiveness of codes in improving compliance or practice cannot be easily
assessed, but one value of a code may lie, as mentioned, in the learning process
through which they are shaped and communicated within an organisation. Another
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lies in the presumption of adherence, so that ignoring a code may have adverse
consequences if legal proceedings are brought against a data controller. A third lies
in the relatively easier processes involved in updating and revision – as with the
CCTV code, for example – when technologies or other circumstances change, rather
than having to resort to the parliamentary vagaries of legislative amendment or
revision.
A code of practice could play a potentially important role with regard to the sharing of
data, an increasing practice across the public sector that gives rise to concerns about
privacy, perhaps particularly in terms of individuals’ ability to understand and control
what happens to their data. The Data Sharing Review Report (Thomas and Walport,
2008) called for the Information Commissioner to be required to produce and keep
up-to-date a data-sharing code of practice that would be approved by Parliament.
This would replace the existing 2007 Framework Code of Practice, which had no
statutory standing or parliamentary involvement. A statutory code would be an
authoritative interpretation of data protection principles, establishing standards for
information sharing. Breaches would not be illegal, but non-compliance would be
taken into account by the courts and the Information Commissioner in relevant cases.
The Government accepted that the Commissioner should have the recommended
statutory duty to develop the code (Ministry of Justice, 2008), and the proposal was
also endorsed by the House of Lords Constitution Committee in 2009 (House of
Lords, 2009).
Data-sharing protocols are similar self-regulatory mechanisms that operate within
legal privacy-protection frameworks in situations where personal data are exchanged
or shared among agencies of different kinds. In multi-agency partnerships for social
and health care or community safety, these documents set out the conditions
governing data sharing among the bodies involved. They may be formal agreements
made with national guidance, as for example that given by the Home Office with
reference to multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) following the
passage of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Bellamy et al., 2008). Protocols, however,
have often been too elaborate and complicated for frontline service practitioners to
implement in their daily work. Therefore, their regulatory efficacy – taken by
themselves – and ability to raise employees’ awareness of privacy issues affecting
public-service clients – frequently among the most vulnerable individuals, who are
less capable of protecting their own privacy – may be questionable.
5.3 Designing privacy protection into information systems
Over the past 20 years, there has been an increasing worldwide interest in protecting
information privacy through the use of technologies operating either at the
organisational and systems end or at the individual’s end of the flow of personal data.
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Generally known as ‘privacy-enhancing technologies’, or PETs, they offer alternative
or complementary ways of limiting privacy invasion, but the question whether privacy
is thereby enhanced, merely maintained, or threatened in unforeseen ways has often
been debated. PETs offer a way of building privacy into systems, rather than bolting
them on as expensive and ineffective afterthoughts.
PETs may help data controllers to comply with many of the requirements of privacy
laws and principles. They can preserve anonymity and confidentiality, provide
physical security for data, give greater control and choice to individuals, and harness
the rule-making properties of information technology (for example, software ‘code’) to
the cause of privacy protection (Lessig, 1999; Reidenberg, 1998). PETs, however,
should not simply be equated with data-security technologies – for example,
passwords, locks, and encryption – in that those devices do not address the
legitimacy of data collection, storage, or exchange, which are all integral parts of
information privacy laws and principles, as well as of the right to privacy (Burkert,
1997).
It is less important to identify and describe particular PETs than to note how they can
be put into practice. Some are built into the design of systems and networks (for
example, default settings governing what data are collected) and may be
incorporated into policies for public-service provision (for example, public-key
cryptography, secure websites, and biometrics – albeit controversial in terms of
privacy). Others are in the hands of individuals themselves as they seek to control
their data and protect their own privacy (for example, anonymous web browsers and
‘cookie’ filters).
In terms of privacy protection, strong or weak forms of these instruments can be
found. As with codes, PETs can give a false sense of reassurance, or detract from
more stringent means of protecting privacy through legal requirements and
enforcement that are necessary. PETs are not a ‘technological fix’ for problems of
regulation, parliamentary scrutiny, or governmental self-restraint. Their effectiveness
may depend on how they are implemented. This may be left to the market, giving
signals to information technologists and businesses to incorporate PETs in their
system architectures and commercial practices. It may be a matter for public policy,
mandating PETs in IT systems used for public-sector transactions. Or the initiative
may lie with the general public, demanding technical safeguards and obtaining
specific consumer privacy tools. In other words, PETs’ contribution depends on
normative and practical decisions. Despite the enthusiasm for PETs, their
deployment has faltered: online businesses and consumers have not been
sufficiently persuaded to develop or demand them (OECD, 2001). The lack of
recognised standards to guide implementation, uncertainty about the benefits of
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PETs, absence of managerial recognition of a responsibility to protect privacy, and
the fear of adopting obsolescent PETs are cited by the ICO as among the reasons for
reluctance to implement these design solutions (ICO, 2008).
Privacy technology efforts have now been re-presented and promoted at national and
international levels in terms of ‘privacy by design’ (PbD) (Cavoukian, 2009; ICO,
2008). This reformulates the PETs philosophy with greater emphasis on system
architectures rather than the individual’s own implementation or on technical devices
as such. PbD presses for a comprehensive set of information governance practices,
standards, and modes of accountability within organisations that process personal
data. PbD requires organisations to understand and accept the need for proactive
ways of complying with privacy protection laws and principles. It might also ideally
require them to have a more nuanced, and perhaps social-psychological,
understanding of the contexts and situations in which people use technology in their
relationships with others, including the state (Palen and Dourish, 2003). In the UK,
emphasis is now also given to articulating the business case for privacy-protective
business processes and information systems, thus helping to achieve a ‘privacy
dividend’ (ICO, 2010a).
It is too soon to say whether these initiatives will bear fruit in the public sector where
PbD and PETs could be mandated in system procurement requirements and
contribute to the protection of privacy rights. However, the historic lack of success of
efforts to encourage and cajole organisations, and other reasons, have prompted a
stronger advocacy of PbD by various authoritative EU sources.53 The European Data
Protection Supervisor, for example, has most recently pressed for embedding the
principle of PbD in EU laws and policies at general and sectoral levels of information
and communication technology within the European Digital Agenda, and in other
situations.
Privacy impact assessment (PIA) is a related, and increasingly popular, privacy
protection technique that plays a part in self-regulation through its association with
design solutions. It can have a key role within statutory regimes: it is legally
mandated in some countries for new technological systems, including the USA at the
federal level. PIAs are described as ‘structured assessments of a project’s potential
impact on privacy, carried out at an early stage’ (Thomas and Walport, 2008, p 31).
They vary considerably in their implementation in terms of how, when, why, and by
whom they are undertaken, how comprehensive they are, as well as other factors.
PIAs are built upon risk assessment but are oriented towards assessing and
mitigating risks to individual privacy rather than risks to the organisation. However,
organisations may be prone to misconstruing PIAs as merely a way of assessing and
mitigating their own legal and financial liability. In the UK, the use of PIAs has been
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endorsed and promoted by the Information Commissioner (ICO, 2008; ICO, 2009).
The rash of data breaches in the UK in 2007-08 resulted in a Government report that
endorsed PIA for government departments (Cabinet Office, 2008). They are not
required by statute, although the House of Lords has recommended that the DPA be
amended to make them mandatory (House of Lords, 2009).
If their development involves organisations in a searching analysis, PIAs can help to
instil a culture of privacy protection. They can also facilitate practical steps in the
design and deployment of information systems, in the training of staff, and in the
acceptance of managerial responsibility for privacy. If guided by principles and with
an eye towards safeguarding privacy rights, they thus may contribute strongly to
privacy protection independently of legal compliance requirements, and on a broader
and deeper basis than the law may demand. On the other hand, PIAs are prone to
perfunctory and box-ticking performance to minimal standards of analysis and
reporting, rather than in terms of principles. Once again, a deceptive impression may
be given of the organisation’s willingness and ability to protect the data they collect,
store, or share, and the PIA may fall short in assessing and mitigating risks of
adverse impact on privacy. Moreover, in addressing the question how a proposed
information system could affect privacy or related values, PIAs may place less
emphasis on the more fundamental question whether the data processing or
surveillance should happen in the first place.
5.4 Public awareness and education
Laws, codes, and technological design are insufficient for privacy protection without
the ability of individuals and groups to help prevent privacy invasions and to press for
remedial action. Privacy regulators rely on the public and advocacy groups to bring
pressure to bear upon potential intruders on information privacy, to complain about
specific violations, and to seek redress. For these purposes, regulators as well as
others engage in campaigns for raising the level of public awareness about their
rights and about the way information processing affects them. A public that is more
aware is arguably more likely to be able to take steps to protect their personal data,
to assert their right to information privacy, and to seek remedies.
Greater public awareness can be brought about through the promotional efforts of
regulators, such as the ICO, who provide publicity material, usable websites, and
guidance to information processors as well as the general public (European
Commission, 2009). In the UK, the Information Commissioner’s alarm bell about
‘sleepwalking into a surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004) was followed by a special
report (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006) that gained prominent media exposure
and prompted important inquiries by parliamentary committees. Other reports in
recent years have helped to elevate the issues to prominence (Royal Academy of
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Engineering, 2007; Liberty, 2007; House of Lords and House of Commons, 2008;
House of Commons, 2008a, House of Commons, 2008b).
In many countries, the attempt to increase the level of public, as well as
parliamentary and governmental, awareness and concern about privacy and
surveillance is spearheaded by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These
have included general civil liberties and human rights groups as well as more
specialised groups of privacy advocates and single-issue campaigns concerning, for
example, identity cards, supermarkets’ use of personal data, health privacy, or
internet privacy issues. However, compared with pressure group activity in many
other areas, privacy advocacy as such takes place through under-resourced, loose
and fragmented networks, with sporadic success (Bennett, 2008).
In the UK, one can identify privacy-related campaigning, publication, and awarenessraising work undertaken by many NGOs.54 The media sometimes publicise alarming
examples of privacy invasion and surveillance – for example, ‘snooping’ on parents
of school-age children – and internet blogging and privacy-advocacy websites alert
people to dangers of information collection and use. Influence over public opinion
and policy is hard to measure, but some groups have gained legislative success
through pressure, contacts with parliamentarians, briefings, as well as contributions
to drafting Bills and secondary legislation. Many groups have also maintained
consultative channels to the ICO. The House of Lords has recommended that the
Government should involve NGOs in the development and implementation of policies
involving surveillance and data processing that have significant implications for the
citizen (House of Lords, 2009).
The strength of such efforts at public education and awareness, as well as policy
influence, is that they are formally independent of political party and governmental
control. In addition, groups often possess specialist knowledge of technologies,
business processes, academic and legal research, and sectors of public opinion that
can be brought to bear upon governmental and business decisions. On the other
hand, their influence often depends upon how well they capitalise on scandals and
‘horror stories’ for their campaigning activities and their attempts to influence public
debate. Moreover, the elusiveness of the meaning of ‘privacy’ and the intricacy of
issues and problems arising from data activities make it difficult to get messages
across to the public and politicians, except perhaps with regard to a few dramatic and
tangible surveillance devices such as CCTV installations. Some of these deficiencies
may be mitigated to the extent that NGOs and campaigners are seen as ‘within the
tent’ in terms of policy-making, but that in turn may bring the danger of blunting their
edge.
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A further benefit of raising public awareness is that it can bring issues to attention
that might otherwise be obscured. For example, the question of how information
privacy is distributed across society – whether it is acceptable in our society for some
to have more privacy than others – is more likely to be raised and placed on the
policy agenda through such activities outside government than through official routes.
Marginalised or vulnerable ethnic and socio-economic groups, and not merely
individuals, may be ‘privacy-poor’ as well. They may lack the means of recourse to
legal remedies and the ability to challenge surveillance practices that impinge on
them, for example as targets for data gathering and monitoring, more than on other
people. Unless their cause is championed by NGOs, the media, regulators, or
individual parliamentarians, it is likely to go unheeded.
5.5 Some regulatory developments abroad
Privacy or data protection laws have proliferated in Europe, North America, and the
Asia-Pacific region. There are also a variety of relationships between these statutory
means and the provisions of some national constitutions, charters of human rights,
and other high-level declarations. National legal instruments for privacy and data
protection are also shaped by international documents, of which the most prominent
are those of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OECD (Council of
Europe, 1981; OECD, 1981; European Union, 1995), but motives related to free
trade and the internal market of the EU often compete with the human rights and
privacy dimensions of these measures.
As in the UK, other countries have had mixed experiences with alternative or
complementary approaches. Although USA federal agencies are covered by the
Privacy Act of 1974, self-regulation is most prominently followed as the preferred
path in the USA for the private sector where the coverage of privacy laws is patchy
and regulatory ‘watchdog’ machinery is lacking. As suggested earlier, PETs have not,
so far, fulfilled their promise anywhere although they have been selectively
implemented; it remains to be seen whether PbD constitutes a lasting improvement.
Concerning the raising of awareness and the public’s knowledge of their rights and
what happens to their data, special occasions such as ‘Data Protection Day’ events
have risen to prominence in the past few years in many countries (Council of Europe,
2010), although beyond the immediate publicity they gain for privacy protection, their
long-term effect cannot yet be gauged. If high levels of public awareness and
vigilance are supposed to act as social support mechanisms underpinning legal and
formal regulation, it is too soon to tell whether this is taking place. However, some
surveys indicate relatively high, albeit fluctuating, levels of public concern over the
protection of their data, perhaps especially online and in social networking
processes.55 But it is prudent to be cautious about surveys and focus-group research,
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because of their methodological shortcomings and the inherent difficulty of carrying
out enquiries into such an elusive and ill-defined value and right as privacy.
An important piece of unfinished international business is the establishment of highlevel standards for privacy protection and for the rights associated with it. These can
be formal and technical standards, dealing with matters of data security, as
promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization or other bodies.
Attempts to go further into information governance and adherence to wider criteria of
good, privacy-protective practice have met with considerable business resistance.
A recent manifestation of the push towards better standards came in the 2009 Madrid
Resolution of the world’s privacy and data protection commissioners, supported by
the 2009 Madrid Declaration of NGOs, privacy advocates, and other organisations
and persons (Madrid Resolution, 2009; Madrid Declaration, 2009). These called for
global standards, closely aligned with the conventional data protection principles but
going further into matters that included better international regulatory co-operation,
staff training, PIAs, PETs, and other proactive procedures. The Resolution
emphasised:
the universal nature of the principles and guarantees underlying this right
[to privacy], and by contributing to a better protection of rights and
freedoms of individuals in a globalized world, characterised by crossborder flows of information.
The Declaration went further to call for a moratorium on many forms of surveillance,
and for:
the establishment of a new international framework for privacy protection,
with the full participation of civil society, that is based on the rule of law,
respect for fundamental human rights, and support for democratic
institutions.
5.6 Summary
There are many ways of protecting privacy in addition to legal provisions. Some of
the leading instruments have been outlined, with comments on their efficacy and
likelihood of doing the work that law itself cannot do. However, it is important to
emphasise three significant points that will affect any reforms in the safeguarding of
information privacy rights that might be proposed. The first point is that law is
essential: without legal specification of privacy rights, other instruments will be busy
but blind to the main issues at stake, and are likely to be incapable of providing the
remedies that individuals may need.
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The second point is that the principles written into law or underpinning it must be –
and normally are – reflected in the specification of other instruments, which can then
be seen as reinforcements and complements to the law and not as substitutes for, or
weaker versions of, privacy laws. For example, the minimisation of personal data
collection, the several dimensions of the quality of data (accuracy, relevance, nonexcessiveness, and timeliness), and the specificity of purpose for data processing
are among the principles that should be inscribed in non-statutory mechanisms if
they are to provide a high degree of protection in conjunction with the law.
The third point is that the art and science of better privacy protection involves
articulating the various legal and other devices with each other. The aim is to design
them into a comprehensive protection regime and not leave them simply as a
piecemeal inventory of measures or ‘tools’ implemented in a disjointed fashion by
various agents, leaving gaps through which privacy intrusions and the erosion of
rights may enter. Whose responsibility it should be – and at what levels, from the
local to the global – to ensure the required integration of instruments and approaches
is an important question for regulatory governance to address.
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6.

Moving forward

6.1 Introduction
Commentators have often criticised the gaps and inadequacy of information privacy
in the US, as compared with the UK and the rest of the EU. Pointing to the EU
Directive – described in Chapter 4 – and its various national incarnations, they have
argued that it provides far stronger privacy protections for European citizens and
residents than those enjoyed by their US counterparts. In large part, this is because it
covers the private sector as well as the public, and requires a ‘supervisory authority’
to enforce the law and perform other important regulatory functions, rather than
leaving individuals to pursue privacy violations in the courts. Unfortunately, this
comparison is only partially valid, and dangerously complacent. Not only is it overly
reliant on a comparison of legislative texts rather than a detailed assessment of how
protections in these different jurisdictions work in practice, it also underplays the
extent to which the European approach often lacks the certainty and solidity that a
rights-based regime requires. Privacy is not best served by the current patchwork of
laws and other instruments that are in place in the UK today, or by the lack of an
overarching regulatory framework within which the idea of information privacy could
play an important part in the protection of this fundamental human right.
In the UK, governments of whatever political party, and parliament, have long
resisted the enactment of a general privacy law, mainly because they have a vested
interest in processing personal data in pursuit of their policies. From the 1980s
onwards, they have only reluctantly and reactively placed data protection law, the
regulation of investigatory powers, and human rights law on the statute book,
although there was a spate of legislation late in this period. As far as data protection
is concerned, both in 1984 and in 1998 governments legislated for fairly minimal
protection through cumbersome and ambiguous legal provisions that leave too much
open to interpretation and fortuitous circumstance before privacy invasions can be
challenged effectively. They have resisted giving more powers and resources to the
ICO as the main regulator for information privacy, and have only recently begun to
raise concerns about the rise of the ‘surveillance society’ and the adverse nature of
many of its effects. Governments have continually given order-making powers to
Ministers to override privacy restrictions on the way personal data is collected,
processed, and disclosed. This trend was only recently reversed with the
abandonment of clause 152 of the Coroners and Justice Bill in 2009, which would
have created a broad power to share personal data for any governmental ‘policy
objective’. Parliament has often found itself unwilling or unable to resist policies and
laws that erode privacy, and has sometimes revealed its inability to understand
sufficiently the nature and extent of the threats to privacy posed by technologies,
economic processes, and even well-intentioned political will. The role of NGOs and
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individuals in shoring up and pursuing the enforcement of information privacy rights
has been consistently undervalued.
As discussed in this Chapter and the next, there is a pressing need for reform in the
area of privacy. In particular, this report argues that more emphasis needs to be
placed on rationalising existing protections, ensuring greater coherence across
different sectoral privacy laws, and strengthening the powers of the regulatory
agencies responsible for enforcing these laws. In addition, this report takes non-legal
mechanisms and instruments seriously, and aims to embed them more firmly into the
culture and practices of public and private organisations.
The most important step is to bring the existing array of protective or permissive
legislation into better and clearer alignment, and to focus it upon purposes more than
on expediency, and to ensure that human rights are protected. Data protection law
and practice should be harmonised with human rights law so that, within government
policy, values beyond information security and the need for effective and efficient
data processing are more clearly recognised, requiring a broader commitment to
privacy from those who collect, use, and disclose personal data. The regulatory
oversight and guidance provided by the investigatory powers regimes need to be
clarified and made more effective so that those engaged in different forms of
surveillance have a clearer grasp of the legitimate scope of their powers. The
juxtaposition of several kinds of Commissioner in the world of surveillance and data
protection needs reconsideration in terms of the clarity of roles, relationships, and
resources to provide sufficient safeguards for the public. Gaps in the coverage of
laws, so that some surveillance domains are inadequately regulated – for example,
the DNA database and CCTV – need to be remedied through statutory enactment
guided by existing human rights and data protection legislation.
We have seen how an overview of information privacy’s rationale and conceptual
basis, along with an assessment of the threats posed to privacy by the development
of data collection and surveillance, can provide a context for looking at the privacyrelated laws and regulatory regimes currently in place in the UK. We have identified
key features of the existing system that could form a basis for future privacy
protections, and pointed out areas of weakness that would need to be overcome if
privacy regulation were to have a more principled foundation and a more coherent
structure.
We do not believe that there is one ‘best solution’ for shoring up information privacy
rights and ensuring that surveillance does not pose a threat to fundamental human
rights. This Chapter sets out a number of principled and practical approaches that
could help to achieve these goals. These approaches involve different areas of the
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law as well as different social and technological means of reform, and seek to identify
new paths for privacy protection. Although we identify four key approaches, these
should not be seen as a menu from which one best choice must be made. There is
much room for debate, one that recognises that some of the approaches – and
indeed others that could be envisaged – represent different emphases rather than
clear alternatives to each other.
6.2 Approach One: a principled foundation
We believe that the protection of information privacy and the regulation of
surveillance and data collection must be based on a clear, principled foundation that
is consistent with a commitment to equality and fundamental human rights.
‘Principles-based regulation’ (PBR), more than ‘rules-based regulation’, has found
favour as an effective way of regulating privacy, and has been recently advocated in
the privacy work of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC, 2008). Although
PBR is characterised by a number of paradoxes that may reduce its attractiveness,56
relying on principles provides necessary flexibility in a climate of rapid technological
change and growing threats to privacy, and focuses on achievable outcomes rather
than the strict enforcement of prescriptive rules. While emphasising principles, the
ALRC has recommended a hybrid approach that also makes clear the importance of
clear rules and sectoral regulation. In this approach, rules are provided for sectors
and fields in which there is a need for clarity about how the principles are to be
fulfilled. This is achieved through specifications in subordinate regulations,
supplemented by guidance.
In the UK, Article 8 provides an overarching framework for the protection of privacy,
and the system of data protection already operates at both the level of eight broad
principles (see below) and of more specific rules and guidance, although – as in
many other countries’ systems – it uses a wider range of instruments as well (Bennett
and Raab, 2006). Whether data protection law as such works well enough in its
entirety, or needs specific redrafting and better implementation is, at the time of
writing, a matter for wide consultation and deliberation in the UK and the EU.
However, the question of the effectiveness of the legal and human rights instruments
that are involved in UK data protection, and the translation of principles into practice,
is of considerable interest.
The most prominent and long-standing set of principles in the world of privacy
protection and information rights are the data protection principles. These are found,
in one form or another, in the landmark documents mentioned in Chapter 4: the
OECD Guidelines of 1980, the Council of Europe Convention of 1981, and the
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. They are also reflected in a large
number of countries’ national legislation and in ‘fair information practice’ standards
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where such legislation is absent.57 Approaches to the regulation of data collection
and processing at both the global (for example, the Madrid Resolution, 2009) and
lower levels (for example, for identification and verification purposes, as being
developed by the Scottish Government) draw heavily upon these principles. In light of
this, questions remain about how helpful these principles are when it comes to
regulating online activity and uses of personal data that were not envisaged in the
1980s and 1990s. They nonetheless provide an important and practical starting point
for thinking about information privacy reform in the UK.
As set out in the UK DPA, Schedule 1, Part I, the data protection principles are as
follows (abridged):
•

Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully […].

•

Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with
that purpose or those purposes.

•

Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purpose or purposes for which they are processed.

•

Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.

•

Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer
than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.

•

Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects
under this Act.

•

Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss
or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.

•

Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the
processing of personal data.

In addition, the DPA gives individuals the right to find out who holds what personal
data about them, to obtain a copy of it, to correct or erase it if it has been unlawfully
processed, and to obtain remedies if these access and correction rights have not
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been complied with. Certain special categories of ‘sensitive’ personal data, such as
racial origin, political opinions, religious or other beliefs, and personal data related to
health or sex life, have additional legal constraints placed on their processing in
Schedule 3 of the DPA.
Provided they are enshrined in legislation – as is the case with the DPA – and
rigorously adhered to, these principles can help to provide a considerable level of
privacy protection. This is especially true where the principles are tailored to the
context and conditions of particular sectors as, for example, recommended by the
Lindop Report (Home Office, 1978). However, unless additional principles – such as
a principle of ‘fair processing’ – are added to the existing list, they are unlikely to be
sufficient. For example, Pounder (2008) has argued that the current UK data
protection regime is more concerned with the ‘how’ of data processing than with the
question of whether processing should take place or not. Further, he argues that
because the existing regime does not provide regulators with the powers necessary
to prevent the state from engaging in overzealous surveillance and data collection,
an additional nine principles are needed. Although one of these new principles deals
with issues of compensation, for the most part they are aimed at ensuring that the
state must demonstrate that any new surveillance measure is necessary and
proportionate, or promoting better parliamentary and regulatory scrutiny of
government surveillance practices (Pounder, 2008, p. 19). Such principles are central
to ensuring that the rights contained in Article 8 are properly protected, and that any
interference with those rights must be in accordance with the law, justified,
proportionate and necessary.
In contrast to these proposals, the ALRC recommends a principle of ‘notification’
requiring ‘organisations to notify individuals or otherwise ensure they are aware of
particular matters relating to the collection and handling of personal information about
the individual’ (ALRC, 2008, vol. I, p. 37).58 A related principle is transparency or
‘openness’, requiring ‘organisations to operate openly and transparently by setting
out clearly expressed policies on its handling of personal information in a Privacy
Policy, including how it collects, holds, uses and discloses personal information’
ALRC, 2008, vol. I, p. 39). However, experience to date with organisations’ opaque
and legalistic privacy policies online and elsewhere has been far from encouraging,
and better approaches to implementing transparency need to be found, perhaps
including strong information rights or ‘trust’ charters adopted by public agencies
(Raab, 2003). A third principle is found in the OECD Guidelines but recently
developed in the international experts’ ‘Galway Project’, and it is also reflected in the
2009 Madrid Resolution of the International Conference of Data Protection and
Privacy Commissioners, and in the Article 29 Working Party’s contribution to EC
consultation on the future of privacy’s legal framework. This is the principle of
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‘accountability’ which, although expressed in terms of ‘companies’, would also apply
to the public sector; it:
shifts the focus of privacy governance to an organisation’s ability to
demonstrate its capacity to achieve specific privacy objectives. It involves
setting privacy protection goals for companies based on criteria
established in law, self-regulation and best practices, and vesting the
organisation with both the ability and the responsibility to determine
appropriate, effective measures to reach those goals. 59
It is debatable whether ‘consent’ should be a further principle in its own right, or
whether – because it is so difficult to define and apply in practice – it should only play
a supportive role to the package of other principles. The ALRC considered this
question following a lengthy consultation process, and concluded that consent should
not be a discrete privacy principle. It did, however, note that consent ‘plays a key role
in the application of other privacy principles – namely those regulating the collection
of sensitive information, use and disclosure, and cross-border data flows’ (ALRC,
2008, vol. I, p. 686),60 and that it should therefore be the subject of guidance and
clarification by the regulatory authority. On the other hand, Rule (2007, pp. 195-6)
has argued that the default position for the public or private sector should be that
there can be no collection, storage, processing, or sharing of personal data without
the meaningful and informed consent of the individual concerned, or – in the case of
the public sector – legislative authorisation. This idea has been adopted by some
privacy regimes, and has particular rhetorical force in a democracy, where the
doctrine of ‘the consent of the governed’ has a long-established and foundational
basis in constitutional theory.
Because this commitment to consent is so frequently set aside for good cause by
circumstances and necessary information requirements in different sectors (for
example, in the criminal justice system), and by problems associated with gaining
‘informed consent’, it is open to question whether such an ‘informational selfdetermination’ principle can serve as a robust foundation for the right to privacy.61 In
addition, the circumstances under which consent is sought (or revoked) vary
considerably across different sectors. As a result, this is a good example of where a
general privacy principle needs to be supplemented by particular rules and guidance.
But regardless of the approach adopted, there also needs to be a fundamental
rethinking of the role of individual consent as regards personal information, and
recognition of the fact that privacy – although a right – is in part a function of
individual and social expectations in specific contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010). There is
a clear need for a deeper debate about role of consent in privacy protection before a
satisfactory resolution can be achieved for the UK.
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In sum, both the data protection principles and the more general privacy principles
outlined above can play a crucial role in helping to create and shape a framework for
the effective protection of information privacy rights, and by extension, other rights
that support but are not directly concerned with information privacy. They give rise to
general rules, and also specific laws in sectors where there is a need to clearly define
the relationship between individuals and those who might threaten their privacy
through the collection and use of their personal data.
The important role that can be played by principles can also be illustrated by
comparing two basic approaches to privacy law and regulation – what Nissenbaum
(2010, pp. 237-8) refers to as the omnibus and the sectoral approaches. The
omnibus approach is based on the assumption that privacy is a fundamental value,
and can provide a starting point for both the development of general privacy laws and
regulations as well as the drafting of detailed legislation and the application of
specific rules.
The sectoral approach is based on the idea that each sector of society needs to take
a different approach to questions of privacy, and that there is little value in attempting
to define privacy or explicitly recognise an overarching right to privacy. According to
this view, reform should be undertaken on a sector-by-sector basis, with different
privacy laws being introduced for health, law enforcement, communications, and so
on. It has become commonplace to contrast European ‘comprehensive’ data
protection legislation with the American ‘sectoral’ patchwork (Gellman, 1993), but this
is an oversimplification more common to policy rhetoric and does not stand up to
closer analysis, at least as far as its description of Europe is concerned.
The current UK approach is a hybrid of these two approaches: omnibus and sectoral.
As has already been argued throughout this report, this mixed approach has not
worked particularly well in the UK, mainly because many fundamental privacy
principles have been undermined or obscured as a result of the complexity and
inconsistency of the current system of legal protections. At present, the protection of
privacy and the regulation of surveillance and data collection is achieved through a
haphazard combination of legislative provisions, regulatory guidelines, common law,
judicial decisions, and other ‘soft law’ instruments. This fragmented approach to
privacy has a number of serious shortcomings. On the one hand, it makes it difficult
for both public and private bodies to locate and correctly interpret the relevant law,
with the result that it is all too easy for these organisations to infringe the public’s
legitimate and legal expectations of privacy. From the point of view of the individual, it
also makes it extremely difficult to determine whether or not one has been subjected
to illegal surveillance or unwarranted data collection, or to establish what, if any,
remedies are available. Given this, in practice the right to an effective remedy under
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Article 13 of the European Convention may not be available to the individual.
Although the enactment of the DPA and the HRA, along with the establishment of the
Office of the Information Commissioner (ICO), has led to a considerable improvement
in this situation, the current system of regulation remains complex and opaque.
Pounder (2008, p. 11) observes that, while government services may be becoming
more joined up, protection is provided by a disjointed plethora of regulators in the
field of personal data and surveillance, established under myriad statutory auspices.
The effectiveness of the principles of openness and accountability is thus diminished,
and the other main principles are very difficult to enforce even if resources were
greater than they have been.
A further problem arises from the fact that although the activities of the police and
other public bodies are regulated, the surveillance activities of private individuals and
organisations are less well controlled. It can be inferred that the state has a positive
obligation to take steps, such as putting in place a legal framework of regulatory
safeguards, to protect individuals’ ECHR rights against interference by others,
because the activities of private organisations or persons, and not only public bodies,
can endanger human rights. Although Article 8 of the ECHR provides the basis –
alongside the existing tort of breach of confidence – for restricting private surveillance
and protecting individual privacy, the law remains relatively underdeveloped in this
area. In particular, the application of the law in relation to workplace surveillance is
unclear, as is that of the law in relation to various forms of computer-based
surveillance such as spyware. In order to protect privacy rights properly, the private
and public sectors should have equally effective – and strong – regulations that are
consistent with one another.
These reasons point to the need to reinforce an omnibus approach incorporating
principles that overarch disparate rules embedded in the laws of various sectors if we
are to prevent further fragmentation and confusion. We also need to consider ways of
improving the architecture of existing provision for privacy protection and ensuring
the consistency of further regulatory developments. Many futures for privacy
protection can be envisaged, but it is useful to focus discussion upon a few
approaches that represent prominent possibilities that can be seen either as
alternatives or as components to be drawn upon in fashioning an improved regime.
The first emphasises a single privacy statute; the second, an enhanced privacy right;
the third argues for more regulatory coherence; and the fourth considers the case for
an enhanced role for common law. These approaches are presented and assessed
below.
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6.3 Approach Two: enhanced protection via legislative reform
In light of these and other problems associated with the current system of regulation,
there is an urgent need for legislative reform. This is an approach that has already
been identified and recommended by others (see House of Lords (2009) for a
detailed discussion). At the very least, legislative reform could simplify, consolidate
and reform the DPA and RIPA.
Information privacy is protected by a wide range of laws and regulations in the UK,
but the current regime suffers from a number of significant weaknesses as shown in
previous chapters. The law has tended to develop in an irregular and largely sporadic
fashion, and there are substantial gaps in the information privacy protections offered
to individual citizens. This is due to the fact that legal reform in this area is typically
reactive in character, with the law responding to rapid and often unexpected changes
in both the technological and political landscape of privacy, surveillance, and data
sharing.
Laws have developed through a combination of case law, legislation, and informal
attempts at self-regulation. The absence of clearly defined, overarching principles
means that each piece of legislation, line of judicial precedent, or code of practice
has to be understood and interpreted within its own specific context. This can make
the task of determining what rules apply to any given form of surveillance or data
collection complex and time-consuming, and increases the likelihood that individuals
will have their privacy infringed or their personal data misused.
Consolidation and reform of legislation that deals with all aspects of individual
privacy, data protection, and surveillance in the public and private sectors, could
more effectively protect the right to privacy enshrined in human rights legislation and
ensure that each previously separate area of privacy law is organised around a clear
definition of privacy and a coherent set of rationales for its protection.
It could help to ensure that all areas of society – the public, government, and the
private sector – have a clear understanding of the demands of privacy and the limits
of surveillance and personal data collection. In addition, reform could provide an
opportunity for lawmakers to develop a definition of privacy that is not only clear and
comprehensible, but which also provides the basis for a consistent set of principles
that can be applied across sectors and different types of data collection, processing,
and sharing.
A second reason for consolidating the existing law is that it makes the task of
updating the law more straightforward. Privacy is an area that is deeply affected by
changes in technology and in practical application. One of the major reasons why UK
privacy law has become so fragmented is that in the past different parts of the
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regulatory system have responded with varying degrees of speed to the challenges
of technological change, or in some case have not responded at all. Consolidation
could not only make the process of reform and updating the law more
straightforward, but could also help to ensure that the definition of privacy and the
principles that govern legal application remain coherent and comprehensible.62
Thirdly, consolidation could aid effective enforcement. Although it might be too much
to expect any single regulator to take responsibility for the protection of privacy
across all sectors of society, consolidated legislation that provides the legislative
authority for a range of regulators – similar to the current UK situation – could not
only help to minimise overlaps and gaps as regards their respective powers, but also
help to ensure that those regulators worked together and in concert with one another.
In addition, it could provide a clear gateway for individual complaints about possible
violations of privacy, complaints that could then be referred to the appropriate
Commissioner or office according to a clear division of statutory responsibilities.

Although the main focus of this report is on information privacy, it has also
considered surveillance as it affects other dimensions of privacy, such as privacy of
communications and behaviour in public spaces. How far the regulation of a wider
range of surveillance activities should be dealt with under a reform of legislation is a
matter for further consideration, and beyond the scope of this report. Having said
this, it seems reasonable to assume that such reforms could address the invasion of
privacy that occurs as a result of the exercise of ‘stop and search’ powers under
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, and provide a range of protections against intrusive,
covert surveillance by the state. In particular, the reforms could incorporate many of
the protections that are currently contained in RIPA, and provide greater clarity on
how the requirements of necessity and proportionality are to be understood in the
context of surveillance by the police and other state authorities.
Reform of the law might additionally give force to the role of technology in the
protection of privacy, as discussed in Chapter 5. PETs and PbD are, by now, wellunderstood ways of protecting privacy through non-legislative means, but they are
more talked about than implemented. On the other hand, PETs could be mandated
by statute, or required as a consequence of the promulgation of a new general or
sectoral legislation. So, too, could PIA as a related administrative and technical
discipline, as in the USA.
While many of the above advantages can be obtained through consolidation of
current legislation, and targeted reform, there are issues that may go beyond simple
consolidation of current legislation and may require wider reform. These merit
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consideration, but would require further discussion and thought before concrete
proposals could be made.
As this report has shown, individual privacy is constantly under threat from a variety
of quarters, as the personal data-gathering and processing capabilities of the public
and private sectors continue to expand at an ever-increasing rate. Wider reform
could mark a major shift in the law’s focus on privacy, and represent a serious
commitment on the part of the government to respecting individual privacy and the
interests all of us have in our personal data. It could provide individuals with greater
protection from what has been described as the emerging surveillance society, and
articulate with the overarching principles. Reform could have the potential to
transform the way in which we think about the place of privacy in our legal system,
and the limits of public and private sector surveillance and data collection.
It could be helpful if wider reform were to set out a series of privacy principles,
perhaps along the lines of those suggested by the ALRC, and augmented in keeping
with current thinking. In addition it could provide an opportunity for lawmakers to
consider whether wider reform should include such things as:
•

a subsidiary right to ‘informational self-determination’ (similar to that which
currently exists in Germany), related closely to existing norms about consent to
data collection and further processing, which would give individuals the right to
decide what information about themselves should be communicated to others and
under what circumstances

•

a subsidiary right to privacy in public spaces, that could provide the basis for the
regulation of technologies such as public-space CCTV, and

•

an explicit recognition of the data protection principles currently contained in the
DPA, such that those principles as well as others indicated in Approach One
would be directly enforceable by the courts, as well as via a regulator (who is
independent and accessible without cost to complainants).

Given the limitations of the current right to privacy contained in the HRA – which can
only be asserted against the public bodies and those undertaking public functions – it
is essential that any reform also apply to the activities of private individuals and
organisations. Aside from the fact that such a change would address one of the most
glaring weaknesses in the current approach to privacy in the UK, it would also help to
ensure that the right is one that can be easily understood by the general public, and
would clarify the state’s positive obligations to protect the rights contained in Article 8.
Finally, given some of the issues outlined above in relation to obtaining relief for a
breach of privacy – whether through the courts, tribunals or regulators – wider reform
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would enhance access to an effective remedy in accordance with Article 13 of the
ECHR.
It must be acknowledged that protection of privacy confronts limits set by certain
other well-established rights that are also embedded in human rights legislation. The
most important of these is the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the
ECHR and Schedule 1, Article 10 of the HRA, giving rise to potential exemptions for
the media. However, the remit of this report precluded the question of the media’s
inclusion or exemption from legal restrictions with respect to privacy. Whether, and
how, any wider reform, or an improved protection of privacy rights, would have to
include the media is an important matter for further consideration. This issue is
extremely difficult both on political grounds, and also in view of experiences of
previous unsuccessful attempts in other jurisdictions to bring the media under the
control of any privacy law that was perceived to threaten the foundational right to
freedom of expression, and the importance of freedom of the media in a democratic
political system.63
Nevertheless, recent UK legal experience is that ‘celebrities’ claims of journalistic and
photographic invasion of their privacy has given rise to prominent cases that have
served to shape jurisprudence in this area. Consideration of changing the regulatory
system of the media from self-regulation to bringing the media under a wider reform
or within the scope of other legislated rights could too easily be seen as special
protection for the wealthy and famous. On the other hand, such privacy legislation
would then be available for all to use, not just the wealthy or privileged.
A further consideration with regard to privacy reform has to do with the social and
political value of privacy, rather than its value solely to individuals, as discussed in
Chapter 3. Legal recognition of the non-individual importance of privacy would
constitute an advance over the current position. This would be especially so if it
addressed the question of discrimination against social groups and categories found
in certain information practices and surveillance activities and strengthened the ability
to exercise other rights (for example, free speech and assembly) without subjection
to the ‘chilling effect’ of surveillance. This protection is likely to be better provided
through explicit grounding in privacy principles and law than through the existing
dispersed array of legal provisions that do not refer to privacy invasion as an element
in the treatment of individuals or groups.
Bringing about the sort of fundamental shift in our thinking about privacy, or
necessarily ensuring that individuals and organisations will suddenly begin to take
privacy seriously is more likely to be achieved by reform of the existing legislation,
the introduction of a well-coordinated series of legal and extra-legal measures, a
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continued focus on new and emerging threats to privacy from both the public and
private sectors, and further consideration of what wider reforms are required.
6.4 Approach Three: improving the current regulatory regime
Central to this approach is the idea that sector-specific privacy laws are likely to be
more effective if they are part of an overarching regulatory structure grounded in law
and based on a clear and coherent set of principles and enforcement mechanisms.
Approach Three is primarily concerned with the regulatory environment and specific
privacy laws. However, it is compatible with other approaches insofar as it represents
an overarching reform that aims to enhance other more ‘localised’ ways of promoting
and protecting the right to privacy. Returning to Chapter 5, it is based on the idea of
integrating laws and other means of safeguarding privacy with a view to creating a
more coherent approach that will foster a symbiotic relationship between ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ law. Such an approach addresses the shortcomings in the current legislative
and regulatory regimes, and would build upon the many past initiatives through legal
reform, the imposition of strong codes of practice and guidance, and the promotion of
technical and organisational change.
Some new legislation might also be desirable.64 For example, there is a clear need
for existing government databases containing personal information to be placed on a
statutory footing, as this would help to define their purpose, specify their limits, and
provide for effective oversight and remedies. However, care must be taken to ensure
that any new legislation is based on and consistent with existing laws, such as the
DPA and RIPA. At the same time, if there is little support for consolidating laws into a
single statute, then various shortcomings with the existing approach to regulation will
also need to be addressed. If the DPA and RIPA are to remain – and provide the
basis for future reforms – they must be amended to ensure that they provide better
protection for Article 8 rights. A comprehensive review of RIPA and other surveillance
laws would help to ensure that there is a fair, coherent, accountable and accessible
regime for the regulation of all forms of surveillance.
Regulatory and enforcement initiatives enable a variety of instruments to do the work
that law by itself, and legal-compliance requirements, cannot achieve. The benefits of
encouraging and rewarding good practice alongside those of sanctioning noncompliance should be more fully built into both managerial accountability practice
and the training of staff at all levels where the handling of personal data is
concerned. Designing privacy and other values into information systems should be
encouraged by governments and by information industries, and made an integral part
of infrastructure procurement processes.
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In the wider society, working to involve NGOs in both raising public awareness of
threats to privacy and in the development of policy-making could substantially help to
further the goal of greater regulatory coherence and effectiveness. It would utilise the
experience and knowledge of outside bodies that often have a better grasp of issues,
problems and solutions. Greater emphasis should be placed on increasing public
understanding and scepticism about what happens to their data, so that pressures
can be brought to bear to improve legal compliance, everyday information practices,
and transparency. More attention should be paid by regulators, NGOs, and datausing organisations themselves to assisting with subject access requests under data
protection law, the value of which is often underestimated as a mechanism for
redress as well as a litmus test of the privacy-protective performance of those who
use personal data.
In addition, the existing system of statutory Commissioners needs to be rationalised.
Although there are good reasons to take a specialised approach to regulation,
unfortunately the current system of privacy protections is marred by a confusing
fragmentation of responsibility and serious disparities in the amount of oversight and
enforcement provided in different sectors. Whether there should be a single
regulatory body – a Privacy Commission – that combines the roles of the currently
separate Information, Surveillance and Interception Commissioners, or the
continuation of a plural but more tightly coordinated arrangement amongst them, is a
question about which opinions differ on grounds of effectiveness, political
pragmatism, and public perception.65 We believe the alternatives should be
canvassed and the relative value of competing administrative criteria weighed,
leading towards a proposal for reform.
Under Approach Three, efforts would also be made to enhance the ability of
regulators to anticipate changes in the personal-data activities of the private and
public sectors, rather than leaving them simply to react to ongoing developments. By
enhancing the ability of regulatory agencies like the ICO to apply research on new
technologies and investigate emerging trends in surveillance and data collection –
either through increased in-house staffing or the greater use of external advisors –
the law is less likely to find itself in the position of having to play catch-up or respond
to dangerous gaps in the protection of privacy. Once again, NGOs could play a
useful advisory role in this process, as could academic researchers.
6.5 Approach Four: an increased role for the common law
Any attempt to reform the legislative framework may also have implications for
existing common law privacy protections. As has already been noted in Section 4,
the tort of breach of confidence has a long history, and has recently evolved into a
powerful tool for the protection of individual privacy in the UK. Originally used to
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protect trade secrets and prevent employees from disclosing sensitive commercial
information to a company’s rivals, the tort has now expanded to include situations
involving the unauthorised disclosure of personal information. Of particular note are
recent developments that have enabled individuals to bring actions for breach of
confidence, even in the absence of any pre-existing commercial or other relationship
between the parties.
On the face of it, it appears that current developments in the law of breach of
confidence are being driven by a desire on the part of the courts to provide more
protection for privacy interests without going so far as to establish a new tort of
privacy. Although it is tempting to welcome any expansion in the law of privacy, this
approach to reform is severely limited in a number of key ways. First and foremost,
because the courts are unlikely to recognise a general tort of privacy in the absence
of specific legislation, common law privacy protections are likely to continue to
develop in an incremental fashion and exacerbate many of the problems identified in
this report. Given that the law of privacy in the UK is already highly fragmented, there
is a danger that even well intentioned judicial activism in the area of privacy will only
make matters worse. In addition, there is also a risk that judicial activism may lead to
further disparities between the level of privacy protection enjoyed by citizens in
different parts of the UK, as decisions of the English courts do not bind their
counterparts in Scotland or Northern Ireland. Finally, because going to court is
typically expensive and time consuming, it can be argued that common law privacy
protections are only likely to be used by the wealthy, and widen the distinction
between privacy haves and have-nots.
It is for these reasons that this report, while not wishing to underplay the importance
of the courts and the role of the judiciary in the development of privacy law in the UK,
does not view common law as an appropriate vehicle for the sort of fundamental
reform that is currently needed. Even if there was an appetite for the creation of a
free-standing tort of privacy, it is not clear how such a tort would operate in
conjunction with existing regulatory structures, or how it would bring coherence to the
law of privacy more generally. As such, the authors of this report believe that
common law reform should only be pursued as a very limited strategy.
6.6 Choosing a new path for privacy
Not all threats to information privacy are of the same severity or likelihood, and there
are differences between the sources of the threats as well, in terms of the forms of
surveillance and information processing they represent. Not all domains of life –
whether shopping, transacting with the state, engaging in financial relationships,
walking in public streets, or maintaining our health – generate the same patterns of
risk or affect all individuals or social groups to the same extent. Therefore, it need not
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be the case that ‘one size fits all’ with regard to the approaches to be put into effect
towards better privacy protection. However, it seems necessary to articulate a
common set of principles underlying them – as we have shown – and to ensure that
an array of privacy-protecting laws and instruments does not amount simply to an ad
hoc assembly of parts that are confusing to the public and cumbersome in practice.
Any ‘new path’ based on the approaches outlined in this section must be anchored in
human rights, and in particular the fundamental right to privacy and an appreciation
of its importance to the kind of society in which we wish to live. It must also adhere to
certain procedural requirements or principles as well. Among these, the scrutiny,
transparency and accountability of the processes giving rise to the need for privacy
protection are especially important. Of similar importance is the accessibility to the
individual, or to those who act on behalf of individuals – perhaps aggregating their
individual interests into collective ones – of the legal and other remedies or the
preventative measures that together constitute the path. Some approaches meet
these fundamental and procedural requirements better than others, but all must be
evaluated in terms of how well they are likely to perform as a new path. But it is one
thing to discern a path; it is another to assess how, at what pace, and who should
traverse it.
‘Choosing a new path’ implies a selection process, involving organisations that
design the means for processing personal data; public bodies that engage in
personal data processing and other forms of surveillance; organisations that
represent individuals’ interests; and individual actors themselves. All these actors
should participate in evaluating the approaches and designing the path. In the UK,
this points towards those involved in the political and legal systems: government and
parliament, regulatory, law-enforcement, and other agencies, pressure groups and
NGOs, the media, and the general public. It also presupposes the contribution that
other interests make: businesses of all kinds, and technological industries. What the
process should look like, ensuring the involvement of disparate actors, is crucial to a
successful outcome – the path that is chosen. This question will be considered in
Chapter 7.
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7.

Proposals for reform

7.1 Introduction
Throughout this report, we have considered many different ways of thinking about
information privacy and how it should be promoted and protected. Chapters One and
Two examined the threats posed to information privacy by advances in technology,
as well as some of the dangers associated with greater levels of state surveillance,
data collection, and information sharing. Chapter 3 explained why information privacy
matters, and looked at a number of different justifications of privacy with a view to
clarifying the value of privacy and why it deserves to be protected. In addition, that
Chapter considered the relationship between privacy and state interests, both now
and in future. Chapters Four and Five surveyed the landscape of domestic and
international privacy law, and considered other means by which information privacy
may be protected within a framework of human rights and with respect to general
privacy principles. Finally, the previous Chapter outlined several approaches to
privacy reform that aim to build on principles, existing privacy rights, and legal
frameworks, while also promoting greater regulatory coherence and increased coordination amongst those responsible for protecting information privacy. These
approaches are also intended to provide a structure for thinking about how different
types of reform might be pursued simultaneously, and to help policymakers identify
exactly what is at stake when considering the potential costs and benefits of any new
information technology or state surveillance practice.
In this Chapter, we set out a number of recommendations that could provide the
basis for a fundamental reform of the way in which information privacy is understood
and protected in the UK. Although it is tempting to compile a long list of sectorspecific reforms and legislative amendments, we believe that such a list would be
both premature and of limited use. As has been noted throughout, the protection of
information privacy has often been hampered by piecemeal efforts at reform and the
lack of a clear rationale. In addition, given that the HRA has established a system of
rights protections in the UK, it is important to ensure that any privacy reform
enhances the existing Article 8 jurisprudence.
With this in mind, this Chapter makes a number of broad recommendations that are
intended to provide the starting point for a more extensive and detailed programme of
privacy reform. It aims to help clear a new path for privacy, one that is sensitive to the
broad range of interests concerned, and yet firmly rooted in a commitment to
fundamental human rights and an awareness of the relationship between the
individual and the state.
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7.2 Recommendations
Recommendation One: the need for privacy principles
In the view of the authors of this report, the single greatest stumbling block to the
effective regulation of information privacy in the UK is the lack of a coherent legal
framework for the protection and promotion of individual privacy. As a result, this
report strongly recommends that any proposed programme of reform must be guided
by a clear set of uniform principles, and an overarching commitment to fundamental
human rights. New privacy protections must not only be compliant with the demands
of the HRA, but also strengthen the right to respect for private and family life
enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.
If information privacy protection is to benefit from new thinking, it is important to
ground change in a (re)statement of overarching principles, as has been shown in
Chapter 6. These principles should be at a high level but avoid unnecessary
abstraction, keeping in mind that they must be implemented through specific
practices and rules, and that regulation based on principles does not necessarily
avoid problems of trust, enforcement, interpretation, and other kinds. We have
outlined the conventional data protection principles as a starting point, and at present
a considerable body of legislation and practice is based upon these principles. It is
important to note, however, that these principles and practices have limitations when
applied to new forms of surveillance that may affect information privacy, but do not
necessarily involve the computerised storage of information or the processing of
identifiable personal data. New strategies must continually be developed to cope with
the increasingly novel ways in which privacy, including information privacy, is at risk.
Extending the existing inventory of principles will help to cover new situations and
clarify responsibilities in the relationship between individuals and the state. In
particular, it is important to revisit the principle of consent and possibly reconsider its
position as a foundational principle. As it stands, its status in theory is uncertain, and
its realisation in practice is often treated as either impossible or optional.
We therefore recommend that the principles for information privacy protection be
restated clearly, with a view to reaffirming the existing data protection principles
within an Article 8 human rights framework, and also emphasising the importance of
lawfulness, accountability, transparency and effective remedy. The principle of
consent should be reformulated, having particular regard to the situations in which it
would be valuable, and to the ways it could be implemented. The principles would
benefit from discussion and debate by a short-term forum drawn largely from the
world of law and academia. This forum would aim to restate and develop a body of
principles that could realistically be applied to the varied contexts in which privacy is
likely to be at stake in the UK in future. It would also examine ways in which the
difficulties and paradoxes of ‘principles-based regulation’ can be handled.
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Recommendation Two: strengthening the right to privacy through legislative
reform
It is important to reinforce the existing right to privacy. The government should
consider reforming existing legislation that touches on matters of privacy in order to
ensure that it is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that
it enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At
minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and data
protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance, and will need to
take into account, and incorporate any legislative changes required as a result of the
proposed new EU data protection legislative regime. In addition, courts should be
given additional powers – via appropriate statutory amendments – to directly enforce
existing data protection regulations and other privacy principles.
It would be desirable if an appropriate legal body or commission undertook an
investigation of how existing privacy rights could be reinforced, especially through the
revision, simplification, and further development of statutory law. This investigation
should engage a wide range of interests and draw on the expertise of specialists in
the fields of law, technology, and social science.
Recommendation Three: promoting greater regulatory coherence
Any system of regulation must be based on law. As discussed earlier in this report,
there are significant gaps in the current legal regime, and in particular in the system
of protection established by RIPA and DPA. We recommend that a comprehensive
review of the DPA, RIPA, and other surveillance laws should be undertaken to
ensure that the regulatory regime governing state surveillance is fair, coherent,
accountable, and accessible. In addition, all government databases that hold
personal information should be placed on a statutory footing, with specific provisions
regulating their remit, oversight and the provision of individual remedies.
The fragmented and un-coordinated system of regulatory Commissioners has been
commented upon earlier in this report. At present, there is a clear need for reforms
that will bring about greater coherence and clarity to the existing system of regulation
around information privacy. This could be achieved in one of three ways: through a
reallocation of powers amongst the existing agencies, by bringing them into one
system, or through closer co-ordination between Commissioners. Implementation of
privacy laws would also be facilitated if a more anticipatory and proactive approach to
regulation, based on knowledge and understanding of trends in technology and
surveillance, were encouraged in place of a largely reactive set of practices.
We therefore recommend that greater regulatory coherence should be a key priority
for any future agenda of privacy reform. As a first step we recommend that a group of
76

PROPSALS FOR REFORM

experts drawn from the public sector, parliament, NGOs and academia be convened
to consider the alternative ways of improving coherence. The aim of this group would
be to develop the terms of the enquiry, and develop alternative regulatory models
that could then be examined in detail by parliament. Ultimately, we would hope that
this process would produce a series of legislative amendments and ministerial orders
that could rationalise the existing system of regulators, and thereby improve the level
of protection currently afforded to information privacy.
Recommendation Four: improved technological and organisational means of
protection
The need for better integration between legal and non-legal means of protecting
information privacy was emphasised earlier. Achieving this goal depends on
developing ways of encouraging the design and use of privacy-protective
technologies, assessing the impact of new information systems on privacy,
encouraging stronger accountability practices in organisations, and involving NGOs
in the protection and promotion of privacy. Although such measures have been
widely discussed in recent years, there is a clear need for a more structured
approach to the development of technological and other non-legal privacy protections
if information privacy is to be safeguarded against future threats.
We therefore recommend that the government take steps to encourage the
development and use of technological and other non-legal solutions to the problem of
information privacy, and that where appropriate, the use of such measures should be
required by law. In addition, we recommend that greater effort be made to help
NGOs and the private sector develop and implement creative approaches to the
protection of privacy, and that the government consider funding public education
programmes aimed at making individuals more aware of the threats to privacy and
the practical ways in which they can protect their own personal information.
We also recommend that information technology developers be encouraged to
incorporate privacy protections into their product designs, and that the government
should make the inclusion of such protections a contractual requirement when
dealing with private sector contractors. In addition, the education and training of
information technology professionals should be reformed to ensure that the
designers and manufacturers of potentially privacy-intrusive products have an
understanding of privacy and data protection principles and their relation to human
rights. This reform is a matter that the relevant technology professional associations,
educators, and the Information Commissioner should be encouraged to undertake in
concert.
Technological solutions, however, require appropriate organisational and ‘cultural’
safeguards to be put in place. Although it is clear that central government has begun
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to learn some of the lessons arising out of the data losses suffered by HMRC and
other departments in recent years, these reforms need to be more widespread. As a
result, we recommend that the government establish a central taskforce responsible
for ensuring that improvements in information handling are properly publicised
throughout government, with a view to establishing a consistent set of best practices
across departments and state agencies.
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8.

Conclusion

Information privacy plays an essential role in our society. As this report has shown,
the right to information privacy is currently under threat in the UK, and is likely to be
faced with further challenges if central and local government continue to expand the
surveillance apparatus of the state. While some forms of surveillance are clearly
beneficial to both individuals and society at large, it is vital to ensure that information
privacy is properly protected through the effective regulation of government
surveillance, including data gathering, processing, and sharing.
In an effort to build on recent government, NGO, and private sector initiatives, this
report has considered how the right to information privacy could be strengthened
through various legal and non-legal reforms. In addition to emphasising the need for
a comprehensive review of existing privacy laws and the regulation of surveillance,
the report has also acknowledged the importance of ensuring that any programme of
reform is consistent with the existing constitutional settlement between the different
jurisdictions of the UK. Finally, the report has shown that there are important
international dimensions of privacy that must be taken into account when thinking
about the future of privacy protection in the UK.
At the heart of the report is a commitment to the idea that information privacy is a
fundamental right, and that the legal framework that seeks to protect it must be
capable of responding to new technologies and changes in the ways in which we
understand and communicate personal information. If we are to develop privacy laws
that will stand the test of time, we must begin to think carefully about why privacy
matters and acknowledge the need for a coherent, comprehensive, and robust
approach to its protection. As this report has shown, the right to privacy is at risk of
being eroded by the growing demand for information by government and the private
sector. Unless we start to reform the law and build a regulatory system capable of
protecting information privacy, we may soon find that it is a thing of the past.
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R v W [2003] EWCA 1632. Attorney General's reference (No. 5 of 2002) [2004]
UKHL 40 at para. 9.
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S. and Marper v The United Kingdom (December 4, 2008) (Application nos.
30562/04 and 30566/04).
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R v W [2003] EWCA Crim 1632.
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See also Surveillance Studies Network (2006).
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The DPA is overseen for the UK by the ICO except for freedom of information
functions, which are handled by the Scottish Information Commissioner under the
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act (FOISA) 2002. Different parts of RIPA are
overseen by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, the Interception of
Communications Commissioner, and the Intelligence Services Commissioner. Until
the present Government indicated its aim to abolish the Identity Cards Act 2006,
there was an Identity Scheme Commissioner. Under RIPA, there is an Investigatory
Powers Tribunal, and under the DPA there is an Information Tribunal.
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There is a large and inconclusive literature on this, canvassing many conceptions
of privacy. Useful anthologies are Schoeman (1984) and Young (1979); and
overviews can be found in Lindsay (2005) and DeCew (2006).
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Most notably in cases such as Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and
United States v Knotts 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
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The definition of ‘personal data’ has been keenly disputed, not least since the case
of Michael John Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, Court
of Appeal (Civil Division) decision of Lord Justices Auld, Mummery and Buxton dated
8 December 2003.
13

For an account of the difference between proportionality and balancing, see Goold,
Lazarus and Swiney (2007). Critical comments on ‘balancing’ are in Raab (1999).
14

For the purpose of this report, common law countries are taken to include
Australia, Barbados, Brunei, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand,
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Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Republic of Ireland, Scotland, Singapore, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, and the United States of America.
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which states that personal data means data that relate to a living individual who can
be identified (a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information that is
in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller.
For this purpose of the Act, personal data also includes any expression of opinion
about the individual, and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any
other person in respect of the individual.
16

The Scottish versions of FOIA and RIPA are mentioned below. The Privacy and
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 – which make it unlawful
for direct marketers to transmit automated, recorded messages without the prior
consent of individual telephone subscribers – are not included in this list as they are
private sector regulations and beyond the scope of this report.
17

It is important to note that the position is considerably different in Scotland. In
addition to being governed by the DPA and HRA, information privacy in Scotland is
also protected by FOISA and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act
(RIPSA) 2002. Scotland also has its own branch of the Office of the Information
Commissioner, which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner for Scotland. For a
detailed review of the law of privacy in Scotland, see: Reid (2009) and MacQueen
(2009).
18

As noted by Glidewell L.J. in Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, 65: ‘It is well known
that in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of
action for breach of a person’s privacy.’ On this point, see also W v Home Office
[2001] EWCA Civ 2081.
19

Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 41. It has also been held that ‘Article 8… protects a
right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings and the outside world.’ See PG (2001) 46
EHRR 51 at page 56.
20

Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1. See also Peck v UK (2003) 36
EHRR 41 and Perry v UK (2004) 39 EHRR 3. In Segerstedt-Wiberg and Ors v
Sweden [2007] EHRR 2, the Court also found an interference with Article 8 where the
Swedish Secret Police had collected and stored information on the applicants,
consisting of newspaper articles, radio programmes, decisions of public authorities
and notes of their public activities.
21

In the s.44 ‘stop and search’ case of Gillan & Quinton v UK [2009] ECHR 28, for
example, the ECHR was strongly influenced by the fact that the breadth of the power
in question had led to it being widely overused.
22

As Gillian Black has observed in her forthcoming book on privacy (Black, 2011):
‘There is no longer any doubt over the availability of the remedy in horizontal
relationships, and this approach was underscored by Resolution 1165 of the Council
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of Europe (passed against the background of the death of the Princess of Wales in a
car crash following pursuit by reporters) which emphasised that Article 8 privacy
rights should be enforceable against private persons, including the media.’ See also
para. 12 of the Resolution, and MacQueen (2009), para 12.2.1.
23

This is a point that has been made by the privacy scholar Professor Bert-Jaap
Koops. See House of Lords (2009), para. 128.
24

See Goold et al. (2007).

25

Although the ICO encourages individuals who are concerned about the ways in
which their personal data is being used to make a formal complaint, the courts can
also award compensation for damage arising out of a breach of the data protection
principles set out in the DPA.
26

It is important to note that these enforcement notices can be appealed, and that
permission for the processing to continue may be granted until the appeal is heard.
27

Note that ICO has no authority to prosecute criminal offences in Scotland, as this
can only be done by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.
28

The new powers are contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The ICO
may issue an assessment notice to a government department to assess compliance
with the DPA and the data sharing Code of Practice. In addition, as of April 2010 the
ICO can order organisations to pay a penalty of up to £500,000 for breaches of the
DPA, and has recently produced statutory guidance on how it proposes to use this
new power. See ICO (2010c). On 24 November, the ICO issued its first penalties, for
£100,000 and £60,000, to Hertfordshire County Council (for twice faxing highly
sensitive personal information to the wrong recipients; and to the company A4e for
the loss of an unencrypted laptop which contained personal information relating to
24,000 people who had used community legal advice centres; see ICO(2010d).
29

According to section 24 of the Republic of Ireland Data Protection Acts 1988 and
2003, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner can appoint an ‘authorised officer’ to
enter and examine the premises of a data controller or data processor. In addition to
being able to enter premises, the authorised officer also has the power to inspect and
copy any information, and require the data controller, data processor or their staff to
provide information about their procedures for complying with the Act, as well as
sources of data, the purposes for which personal data is being kept, and information
about the disclosure of data.
30

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A
comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union,
COM(2010) 609 final, Brussels 4.11.2010. Available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf
[Accessed 9 January 2011].
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31

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01. Available
from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf [Accessed 9 January
2011]. The Charter was promulgated in 2000 and is now recognised by the EU’s
Lisbon Treaty. It applies to EU institutions and bodies, and applies to Member States
when they are acting within the scope of EU law.
32

The law does, however, provide for the interception of such communications in
certain circumstances. The most straightforward of these is when both parties to the
communication consent to its being intercepted, and in such cases the information
obtained can be used as evidence (RIPA 2000, sections 3(1), 18(4) and 18(5)).
When only one party—either the sender or the receiver—consents, however,
authorization under Part II of RIPA 2000 is required. In practice, this form of
authorisation is most likely used when one of the parties to the communication is an
undercover police officer or the target of blackmail. According to sections 18(4) and
18(5) of the Act, information obtained from such communications is admissible as
evidence.
33

R v E [2004] EWCA Crim 1243, discussed in Harfield and Harfield, (2005), p. 126.

34

R v Aujia [1998] 2 Cr App R 16. See also Harfield and Harfield (2005), p. 126.

35

It is important to note that although it is clear, for example, that an employer is
entitled to monitor email transmitted on their network when consent has been given
or the communication relates to the employer’s business, according to advice issued
by the Office of the Information Commissioner in 2002, it may be illegal to intercept
non-work related communications. This view is in line with the decision taken by the
ECtHR in Halford v United Kingdom (1997) IRLR 471, where it was held that the
tapping of a telephone on a private network without consent or prior warning
constituted a breach of the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention. The
situation is further complicated by the fact that although RIPA regulates access to the
contents of a communication, it says nothing about the monitoring of traffic on a
private network. As such, it is unclear whether an employer is legally able to monitor
when private calls are made or to record the addresses of websites visited by
employees. Although the ICO has suggested that operators of private networks
should lay down clear guidelines for the use of their systems – and indicate when
and what sort of monitoring is likely to take place – employers and other operators of
private communications systems are not required by law to do so.
36

Summarised definitions taken from Harfield and Harfield (2005), pp. 31 and 49.

37

According to sections 28, 29, and 30 of RIPA, authority to carry out directed
surveillance can only be granted by an authorising officer or some other person
empowered under the statutory instruments that have since amended the Act.
Examples of such authorising officers include police superintendents, certain
customs officials, and local authority chief officers. As specified by section 28(2),
before any authority is granted, the authorising officers must be satisfied that the
surveillance in question is both proportionate to, and necessary for, one or more of
the purposes set out in section 28(3), which include: the interests of national security;
preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; the economic wellbeing of the
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United Kingdom; the interests of public safety; protecting public health; and
assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge
payable to a government department. Authorisations can last up to a period of three
months. However, the authorising officer who granted or most recently renewed the
authorisation is obliged to cancel it if the surveillance is either no longer necessary or
no longer meets the criteria for its original authorisation. (RIPA Code of Practice
paragraphs 4.28 and 4.2). In cases of intrusive surveillance, authorisation is also
needed from a designated authorising officer, who must notify the Office of
Surveillance Commissioners (OSC) in writing, detailing the type and purpose of the
planned surveillance. Written approval must then be received by the authorising
officer from the OSC before the surveillance can take place. The threshold for
authorising intrusive surveillance is higher than that for directed surveillance, and it
can only be carried out to prevent or detect serious crime, for national security
purposes, or to protect the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom.
38

The Covert Surveillance Code of Practice was published by the Home Office
according to section 71 of RIPA, and provides guidance on the use of covert
surveillance by public authorities under Part II of the Act, and replaces the code of
practice issued in 1999 pursuant to section 101(3) of the Police Act 1997. In
Scotland, a broadly equivalent Code was issued according to The Regulation of
Investigatory Powers (Covert Surveillance – Code of Practice) (Scotland) Order
2003.
39

See, for example, the decision of the ECtHR in Friedl v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR
83. For a discussion of the privacy issues raised by the use of CCTV cameras in
public spaces, see: Goold (2002, 2006).
40

In December 2009 an interim CCTV regulator was appointed to work with the
national CCTV strategy board on six key areas. ‘These are to: develop national
standards for the installation and use of CCTV in public space; determine training
requirements for users and practitioners; engage with the public and private sector in
determining the need for and potential content of any regulatory framework; raise
public awareness and understanding of how CCTV operates and how it contributes
to tackling crime and increasing public protection; review the existing
recommendations of the national CCTV strategy and advise the strategy board on
implementation, timelines and cost and development of an effective evidence base;
and promote public awareness of the complaints process and criteria for complaints
to the relevant agencies (for example, Information Commissioner, local authority or
private organisation) or how to deal with complaints relating to technical
standards.’(Hansard 15 December 2009 col.114). The Coalition Government has
pledged to bring forward proposals for CCTV regulation.
41

Attorney General’s Reference (No.5 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 40 at paragraph 9.

42

This view of RIPA has been rejected by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, who
stated: ‘There has been a continued improvement in the general presentation of
RIPA documentation. I am disappointed that there continues to be a perception that
RIPA is the cause of unnecessary bureaucracy. Where bureaucracy results it is
usually the consequence of poor training, less than skillful writing or a lack of time
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available to the author to construct the case for the use of covert activity coherently.
It should not, in my opinion, be construed as unnecessary – when seeking the
protection that this powerful legislation provides – to produce documentation which
will withstand scrutiny in a court of law.’ Chief Surveillance Commissioner (2008), p.
11.
43

Note that the current Home Office review includes the use of RIPA by local
authorities and access to communications data more generally within its remit.
Liberty urges the Coalition Government to carry out a wider-ranging review of RIPA
to include: who should authorise the use of RIPA powers, which bodies have access
to such powers, and for what purpose such access is available. In addition, Liberty
also argues that the Home Office should consider further safeguards to ensure that
RIPA complies with human rights standards, including reviewing the procedure of the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal.
44

Marx (2004).

45

Gillespie (2009).

46

On this point, see Department of Constitutional Affairs (2003), Section 2.

47

Although on the face of it the Second Data Protection Principle – that personal
data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall
not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those
purposes (Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part 1) – appears to prohibit data
sharing unless it is in accordance with the purpose for which the information is being
held, the position may in fact be more complex. For example, according to advice
published by the then Department for Constitutional Affairs (2003, Section 6, para.
24) – now the Ministry of Justice – the government takes the view that ‘[c]ompatible
does not mean 'identical to', and purposes which are quite different from the original
purposes can still be compatible with those original purposes. We believe that,
provided the further processing is for a purpose that is not contradictory to the
originally specified purpose or purposes, it will be consistent with the second
principle’.
48

It is worth noting that one of the most recent bodies tasked with considering how
best to regulate data sharing between government departments – Cabinet
Committee MISC 31 – produced little in the way of substantive recommendations or
solutions.
49

The modern tort of breach of confidence is generally taken to have been
established by Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1948]
RPC 203. In order for an action for breach of confidence to succeed, three
requirements must be met: (1) The information must ‘have the necessary element of
confidence about it’ and therefore must not already be in the public domain; (2) The
defendant must be under some pre-existing ‘obligation of confidence’; and (3) The
defendant must make some unauthorised use of the information. Although in many
cases an obligation of confidence will arise from some pre-existing relationship –such
as employment – following the decision in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969]
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RPC 41 a broader approach has been taken. According to Megarry J in Coco, the
appropriate test is one based on reasonableness, with the court being required to ask
whether ‘any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information
would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given
to him in confidence’ (p. 47).
50

The major defence to an action for breach of confidence is that the communication
was disclosed in the public interest. Although this defence has been raised in a
number of recent high-profile cases involving celebrities such as Naomi Campbell
and Catherine Zeta-Jones, it is unlikely to be available in the majority of cases given
that there is rarely a compelling public interest in disclosing confidential information
about ordinary individuals. These cases are significant, however, insofar as they
have helped to clarify the relationship between breach of confidence and the right to
privacy established under the HRA. Whereas in the past the courts have taken a
fairly narrow view of the idea of personal information, according to the 2004
judgement of the House of Lords in Campbell v Mirror Newspapers, the law of breach
of confidence must now take a broader view based on the values enshrined in the
HRA, most notably Article 8. Under this new approach, when a breach of confidence
is claimed, the court must determine whether the information in question is
sufficiently private as to fall within the ambit of Article 8.
51

See Bennett and Raab (2006), Chs. 6 and 7.

52

Report of the Committee on Data Protection, Chairman: Sir Norman Lindop,
London: HMSO 1978, Cmnd. 7341, pp. 164-81. Lindop’s approach has been
modified in new recommendations by Dr Chris Pounder in A Draft Blueprint for the
Next Generation of Data Protection Law Based on Codes of Practice, June 2007,
available at: http://www. amberhawk.com/policydoc.asp, accessed 17/9/10.
53

These include the Article 29 Working Party established under Directive 95/46/EC,
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and Vivian Reding, the European
Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. See Article 29
Working Party (2009); EDPS 2010; OUT-LAW news (2010).
54

For example, Liberty, Justice, Privacy International, No2ID, the online Foundation
for Information Policy Research, the British Computer Society, and the Enterprise
Privacy Group.
55

For example, Eurobarometer (2008).

56

See Black (2008) for caveats about principles, and for a penetrating analysis of the
paradoxes of interpretation, communication, compliance, enforcement, internal
management, ethics, and trust.
57

It is important to note that because a country will often modify the data protection
principles before enshrining them in domestic law, there is a danger that the
universality of the principles is being gradually undermined. In this regard, the data
protection principles are at risk of becoming a victim of their own success.
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58

This should not be confused with notification – formerly ‘registration’ – under the
DPA, whereby data holders notify the regulatory authority, but not individuals, of their
data processing activities. In practice, the ALRC’s ‘or otherwise’ provision could lead
to a weakening of the notification principle.
59

Hunton & Williams LLP, Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Data Protection
Accountability: The Essential Elements – A Document for Discussion, October 2009,
pp. 2-3; ‘Global Privacy Standards for a Global World – The Madrid Privacy
Declaration, 3 November 2009’, http://thepublicvoice.org/madrid-declaration/,
accessed 10 November 2009; Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy, WP
168, 1 December 2009. These endorsements of the principle have been criticised on
grounds of vagueness and incompleteness; see Colin Bennett, ‘International privacy
standards: Can accountability be adequate?’ Privacy Laws & Business International
Newsletter, Issue 106, August 2010, pp. 21-3.
60

See Chapter 19 of that report for a full discussion of consent.

61

See Manson and O’Neill (2007) for a sceptical analysis of ‘informed consent’ in the
field of bioethics.
62

Ideally, this would also provide a clear rationale for the protection of privacy, and
be based on an adherence to one or more of the privacy theories identified in
Chapter 3 of this report. Having a stated rationale would not only provide regulators
and the courts with a ‘touchstone’ when it comes to questions of statutory
interpretation, but also provide lawmakers with a structure for future amendments
and complementary legislation.
63

For the recent Australian attempt to grapple with the journalistic exemption from
privacy law, see ALRC (2008), vol. II, pp. 1439-73.
64

Potential opportunities to consider this arise through the forthcoming Freedom Bill
and consultations on changes in the DPA and the EU Directive.
65

If FOI laws and their enforcement machinery are included in any reform, the
separate Scottish FOI arrangements would also have to be addressed.
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This report examines the threats to information
privacy that have emerged in recent years, focusing
on the activities of the state. It identifies two
principal areas of concern: the state’s handling of
personal data, and the use of surveillance by public
bodies. The report finds that the existing approach
to the protection of information privacy in the UK
is fundamentally flawed, and that there is a pressing
need for widespread legislative reform. The report
argues for the establishment of a number of key
‘privacy principles’ that can be used to guide future
legal reforms and the development of sector-specific
regulation.

